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Free enterprise 
on the cheap
— Australia and the world recession
—  Laurie A arons
Laurie Aarons looks at the w orld recession, its effects on Australia, exam ines  
differing views abou t its causes an d  what sh o u ld  be done, suggesting som e ideas f o r  a 
w orking class a lternative to  the so lu tions suggested by  upholders o f  the capitalist 
system .
The capitalist world is not yet suffering a 
depression on the scale of the 1930s, but few 
serious observers, whether supporters or 
opponents of capitalist "free enterprise", rule 
out the possibility. M any believe we are on the 
brink.
"There is no clearcut definition of a 
depression", reports Australian journalist 
Paul Sheehan from  the US heartland of 
capitalism, "but many economists seem to 
accept that an economic dow nturn that 
causes at least 10 percent unemployment for a 
full year and a surge of bankruptcies and 
destroys confidence in longterm investment 
would qualify." (Sydney Morning Herald, 
2/3/82.)
Many capitalist countries, including 
Australia, are already close to qualifying 
under this definition. True, unemployment 
has not yet reached the tragic figures of 1933, 
but these no longer seem impossible.
Australian unem ploym ent has exceeded 
500,000 for the first time since 1933 and is now 
7.4 percent of the workforce. Over 11 million
Americans are out of work — 10.1 percent — 
Britain and Belgium have 14 percent, even 
West Germany now reports 7.5 percent. Very 
few economists, if any, predict anything but 
worse figures next year.
Some may say: "Well, that's bad, but after 
all unemployment reached 25 to 30 percent of 
the workforce during the Depression." That's 
true, but this took some time to develop, as 
Leonard Silk of the New York Times points 
out:
"Nationally, unemployment (in the USA) 
has risen so far to less than 9 percent, far 
below the peak of 25 percent in 1933 .... But it 
took a few years of continuous erosion for the 
jobless rate to get that high — in 1930, the 
year after the crash, the unem ploym ent rate 
averaged 8.7 percent; in 1931 it got up to 15.9 
percent and in 1932 to 23.6 percent." (SM H, 
5/3/82.)
The Great Depression hit A ustralia hard 
and quickly, unemployment reaching 18.4 
percent in 1930, compared with only 8.9 
percent in the USA ands 16 in Britain. But
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Unemployed as percent of workforce
Year Australia Germany
1929 10.2 22.7
1930 18.4 34.3
1931 26.5 43.8
1932 28.1 36.2
1933 24.2 20.5
USA Britain Sweden
3.2 10.4 10.2
8.9 16.1 11.9
15.9 21.3 16.8
23.6 22.1 22.4
24.9 19.9 23.3
there was little difference between countries 
by 1932 (except for Germ any), as the above 
table shows.
Britain's jobless rate, already close to  that 
of 1930, is expected to  reach that figure by 
June next year when 3.5 million people will be 
unemployed. A ustralia 's rate next year will be 
well over 10 percent, with some pessimists 
predicting 13 percent.
1. They couldn't see it coming
The economic crisis has developed rapidly 
and its perception by orthodox  economists, 
conservative politicians and the media has 
been sudden and shocked, particularly in 
Australia. They deluded themselves with the 
" re s o u rc e s  b o o m "  a n d  n e v e r -e n d in g  
investment, lulled by belief in the Liberals' 
God-bestowed economic expertise which 
would restore prosperity after Labor's 
ruinous three years.
Failure to  realise the recession's severity 
arose largely because orthodox economists, 
business executives, Liberal politicians and 
the media saw only the economic indications 
they wanted to see. They deliberately ignored 
unem ploym ent which, at tha t stage, hit 
hardest at the young. W hen the problem  was 
adm itted, it was dismissed by the "dole 
bludger" image created by the media 
(M urdoch's to the van) and eagerly taken up 
by the Liberal Party.
This attitude is by no means extinct. A 
certain Keith Campbell, m anager of Westpac 
Bank branch in Fairfield (NSW ), discussing 
the present recession, declares: "I think
anyone who wants a jo b  can still get one. The 
u n e m p l o y e d  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  t h e  
unem ployable." (SM H , 5 /10 /82 .)
This reactionary view, heard during the 
1930s to o , is h a rd e r  to  su s ta in  as 
unem ploym ent spreads to all sections of the 
workforce, no longer confined to  those 
considered "unemployable" or expendable. 
Lay-offs are spreading throughout the 
country, including skilled workers and people 
who've worked for 30 or 40 years. Whole 
regions face the probability of years of being 
"depressed areas" — Sydney's western 
suburbs, W hyalla, Albury, Newcastle and 
W ollongong, for example.
T he re c o rd  show s how  c a p ita lis t 
representatives ignored economic reality, 
deliberately or through ignorance, jaw boning 
the economy into an illusory prosperity. The 
leading Liberal political econom ist, Treasurer 
How ard, proudly told the nation on February 
26, 1981, that AUSTRALIA IS OUT OF 
RECESSION (according to  the Financial 
Review headline the next day.)
"The Treasurer, M r Howard, yesterday 
proclaimed the end of the recession in a m ajor 
speech on the economy delivered in Federal 
Parliam ent," the paper reported. "The 
A ustralian economy was now growing 
strongly because the Federal Government 
had tackled its fundam ental problems."
How ard's chief adviser, Treasury Secretary 
S to n e , h a d  e a r l ie r  fo re s h a d o w e d  
this optimism, predicting that "the Australian 
econom y would grow strongly this year, 
despite the economic dow nturn in the 
W estern world and the effects of the drought." 
(FR, 30/1/81.)
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BOOM .... boom .... BUST
Financial journalists joined the paean, with 
David Potts of the Financial Review writing a 
lo n g  a r t i c l e  h e a d e d  T H E  B O O M  
INDUSTRIES TAKE OFF IN A U ST ­
RALIA (FR, 27/2/81). Euphoria persists to 
year's end and even a little longer. The front 
page of the Financial Review for July 10,1981 
proudly reports tha t AUSTRALIA LEADS  
WESTERN GROWTH STAKES, saying:
"The O ECD  predicts that Australia's real 
gross domestic product (G D P) should grow 
by 5.75 percent this year and by 5.25 percent 
in 1982, close to  double the expected O ECD  
average. In stark contrast to its overall 
projection of a delayed world recovery, the 
OECD predicts rapid expansion of the 
A u s tr a l ia n  e c o n o m y  b a se d  o n  th e  
development of energy and resource based 
industries."
The O ECD 's capacity to predict, never 
crash 'hot, has been upset by the years of 
economic instability which began in 1974, as 
Ross Gittins of the Sydney Morning Herald 
recently pointed out:
"Every six m onths the OECD issues a 
forecast for the (W estern) world economy. 
The latest forecast, issued at the end of 
December, predicted an upturn  in the world 
economy would begin in about six months. 
The previous forecast, issued last June, 
predicted an upturn  in the world economy six 
months later. And the one before that, issued 
in December 1980, also predicted an upturn 
six m onths later." (SM H , 3 /3 /82 .)
The more things change, the more they 
remain the same! In the 1930s, the catchcry 
Was: "Prosperity is just around the corner". 
The O ECD  experts still await the world 
economic upturn, 22 m onths after their first 
guess of six m onths, but they won't be holding 
their breath.
O ECD's A ustralian forecasts were little 
closer. G D P increased only 2.9 percent in 
1980/81. instead ol the predicted 5.75 
percent, while instead of a 5.25 percent rise 
1981/82 saw only a 2.6 percent increase. Next 
year will be even worse, as G D P will decline 
or, as the econom ists' jargon has it,
"experience negative growth".
The financial press continues its optimism 
up till year's end, and even into 1982. The 
Financial Review's pontifical editorialist 
writes on O ctober 21, 1981, under the 
headline It's a boom, but don't shout about it:
"But there is a weight of evidence to  show 
that a boom  is in progress, even if some are 
benefitting more than others ....
"So the investment boom, while it will 
wreak changes in the structure of A ustralian 
industry, will itself be changing in shape. But 
the fundam ental m omentum exists, and 
A ustralia's high economic growth relative to  
most o f the Western world attests that most of 
the investment plans are not misplaced."
The Financial Review continued in this 
strain for another five m onths, until by April 
6, 1982 the outlook was for a "levelling out" 
according to the IN D ECS forecast published 
that day.
"N ot all the economics news is bad," the 
IN D EC S forecast said. "So far A ustralia has 
escaped the world recession and the economy, 
while not booming, is not getting worse .... 
The recovery is over, but the economy is 
moving sideways rather than being in 
recession."
"It's here .... and serious"
This "sideways movement" lasted a bare 
eight days, when the editor of the Financial 
Review  p o n tif ic a te s  a g a in , b u t very 
differently, in a long article headed Recession: 
IT'S HERE AND SERIOUS by P P 
McGuinness. This font of economic wisdom 
not only reveals the tru th  about the economy 
(already well-known to the jobless, marxists 
and other riffraff), but also unveils the 
answer. This is not so much directed towards 
solving the recession but about how "we" 
should prepare for the next recovery.
Mr McGuiness explains that there is little 
to be done about the recession here, which 
depends on the state of the capitalist world 
economy generally, and the United States in 
particular. But unless workers' real wages are 
reduced, he tells the capitalists, "we" won't be 
ready to  take advantage of the upturn  when
4 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 82
— and if — it comes. Not that the capitalists 
need convincing, because they would like to 
cut wages all the time, boom  or depression or 
stagnation.
2. From recession to depression — 
Australia and the world
All sides of politics accept tha t the world 
economic outlook is decisive for Australia's 
e c o n o m ic  p ro s p e c ts  a n d  th e  s o c ia l  
consequences flowing from  a deep and 
prolonged depression. It would therefore be 
useful to examine some current views about 
the world economic situation and concepts of 
the nature and causes of capitalism 's malaise.
Leonard Silk, economics editor of the New 
York Times, noting recently tha t the world 
economic system is "suffering the most acute 
stress it has know n in half a century", 
examines some theoretical and ideological 
issues this raises.
He quotes Italian econom ist Riccardo 
Parboni, o f M odena University, who 
"contends that the unfolding of global events 
compels the rehabilitation of earlier views 
that the capitalist system is prone to  severe 
crises that threaten its existence". This view 
was held not only by M arx and Lenin, but 
also by "such anti-com m unist thinkers as 
Joseph Schum peter and John  M aynard 
Keynes".
Silk then quotes from  Parboni's estimate of 
some results of capitalist crisis as developed 
by three of those thinkers, suggesting their 
views are being confirmed:
"Creating a new relationship of forces 
between capitalists and workers — one more 
favorable to  the capitalists (M arx). The 
present high unem ploym ent has dealt a hard 
blow to trade union strength in the United 
States, Britain and other industrial countries.
"Strengthening the largest and most 
powerful industrial groups at the expense of 
smaller producers (Schum peter). The current 
wave of mergers and takeovers, in banking as 
well as industry, looks like w orking out of this 
asserted effect of capitalist crisis.
"Sharpening conflict between capitalist 
countries for control of m arket outlets and 
supplies of raw m aterials (Lenin). The current 
conflicts between the US, Japan  and the West 
European countries for world m arkets in cars, 
steel, com puters and other m anufactured 
goods is one aspect of the crisis." (SMH, 
7I9/82.)
One should add to this last conclusion the 
d eep -sea ted  an d  p o litic a lly  exp lo siv e  
difference between the US and West Europe 
over construction of the Soviet gas pipeline.
It is a sign of the times that m arxist ideas of 
crisis are discussed seriously, even though 
they are over-simplified and do not always 
correctly reflect m arxist insights. (For 
example, M arx saw capitalist crises as 
p r o d u c in g  m u c h  m o re  f u n d a m e n ta l  
consequences than  the one quoted, and he 
described the concentration of capital long 
before Schum peter. Lenin saw imperialism as 
the motive force for the struggle over markets 
and raw m aterials; crises intensify that 
struggle.)
Retreat from Keynesianism
M r Silk points out that Keynes supplied the 
ideas upon which the institution of the post­
war capitalist world were constructed, 
concluding with this analysis:
"Keynesian remedies for the perceived 
weakness of capitalism  gave rise after W orld 
W ar II to the greatest period of growth in 
world output and trade in history. But in 
solving one great problem  — depression and 
unem ploym ent — the Keynesian revolution 
helped pave the way for world-wide inflation.
"In recent years, the effort of the US and 
other advanced industrial countries has been 
to halt inflation, but the m ethods used have 
brought back the capitalist crisis with a 
vengeance." (SMH, 7 /9 /82 .)
These "methods used to  halt inflation" are 
the return to pre-Keynesian m onetarist 
measures applied in varying degrees in 
Britain, West Europe, USA and Australia.
Views on the underlying causes of the world
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economic crisis are worth discussing. Three 
main causes are suggested: a prolonged 
period of stagnation in the world economy; 
the growth of national, corporate and private 
debt; the decline of dem and due to  erosion of 
purchasing power.
3. From stagnation to depression
Professor Daniel R Fusfeld, of the 
University of M ichigan in the United States, 
has noted that every great depression like 
those of the 1840s, 1890s and 1930s has 
followed a period of relative stagnation in the 
world economy. He suggested in August 1978 
that the period of relative stagnation was still 
in its early stages but could collapse into 
depression by 1984.
World capitalism  developed rapidly for 25 
years after W orld W ar II, then entered a 
prolonged period of relative stagnation for a 
decade or so, and is now in the stage of serious 
recession which could plunge into depression. 
Movements in A ustralia 's G D P illustrate this 
trend.
Australia's G D P  rose from  $7,849 million 
in 1949-1950 to $11,976 million in 1959-1960 
(in constant 1953/54 prices) — a 52 percent 
rise over the decade, or an average of 5.2 
percent annually.
In the next decade, G D P  rose from $16,330 
million in 1959/60 to  $27,411 million (in 
constant 1966/67 prices)in 1969/70. This was 
67 percent over the decade, or an average 6.7 
percent.
The next decade saw a slowing of the rate of 
growth, from  $50,765 million in 1969/70 to 
$69,604 million (in constant 1974/75 prices) 
in 1979/80, a ten-years increase of 37 percent 
or an annual rise of only 3.7 percent. The
tendency to stagnation is greater in recent 
years, as the table below shows:
This averages out at 2.5 percent over the six 
years, coinciding with the Fraser government 
but scarcely confirming its pretensions to 
"superior economic management". G D P in
1981 / 82 is estimated to be 2.5 percent, while it 
is certain to  fall in this financial year.
The falling rate of increase in production, 
and actual declines, is now worldwide, as the 
last m ajor capitalist nation, Japan, enters this 
phase. Britain's national output actually fell 
by 5.5 prcent from  1979 to  1981, the US gross 
national product declined by 0.2 percent m
1980, rose by 1.9 percent in 1981 and will 
rem ain static, o r fall, this year.
4. "Mountains of debt" 
and financial crisis
A second m ajor feature of the capitalist 
world economy is the huge increase in debt 
and the chronic danger that even one default 
could precipitate a financial crisis like tha t of 
the 1930s. Mexico, Poland, Brazil and a 
dozen other countries are grave risks, owing 
hundreds of billions to the big W estern banks 
and financial institutions.
The next table shows the position of 
12 m ajor debtor "developing countries", their 
total foreign debt, the payments of interest 
and principal due this year, and this latter 
am ount as a percentage of their current 
account (CA) overseas earnings.
Third World hardest hit
M ost of these countries, though not all, are 
"less developed Countries" (LDCs) and, apart 
from M exico, Brazil and Indonesia, are oil-
Increase in GDP over the previous year
Year Percent Rise Year Percent Rise
1975/76 2.6 1978/79 4.4
1976/77 3.0 1979/80 1.9
1977/78 0.4 1980/81 2.8
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Country Total debt 
Sbillions
Mexico 80.9
Brazil 67.0
Venezuela 40.6
Argentina 34.7
South Korea 30.5
Yugoslavia 13.0
Chile 14.1
Philippines 15.6
Taiwan 10.3
Israel 10.0
Indonesia 9.7
Algeria 9.1
Annual payments due
Sbillions %age of
29.2 97
30.9 114
19.9 77
12.0 93
12.9 46
3.4 16
4.6 64
6.6 77
5.2 20
4.8 32
5.2 22
5.5 32
deficient countries. This draws attention to 
another cause of the world crisis — the 
contradiction between the LDCs and the 
"advanced industrial countries" (the capitalist 
countries).
Due to  the historical legacy of colonialism, 
the LDCs are m ainly producers of raw 
m aterials whose economies are tied to the 
industrialised capitalist countries. The 
notorious "scissors effect" has accelerated 
over the last 10 years, with prices for 
m anufactured goods rising m ore quickly than 
the price of raw m aterials, with one notable 
exception — oil. However, the oil price rise 
was incorporated into the price of exports 
from  industrialised capitalist countries and 
therefore hit the oil-deficient LDCs much 
harder than  the capitalist powers, particularly 
those which shared, through the oil giants, 
the international redistribution of wealth 
flowing from  oil price rises.
The recent drastic decline in world 
com m odity prices, which affected Australia 
greatly, is disastrous for the LDCs and has 
deepened the world financial crisis as falling 
export incomes reduce capacity to pay the 
huge interest debt. W ith the recent oil price 
fall, even oil-rich countries like Mexico face 
insolvency. How m uch worse is the crisis for 
countries lacking oil, hit by the decline in 
prices for their staple exports while prices for
th e ir  im p o rts  o f c a p ita l  goods and  
m a n u fa c tu re s  a re  k e p t up  by th e  
m ultinationals and the bankers dem anding 
their pound of flesh?
John  Calverley of American Express 
International Banking C orporation recently 
estimated (FR , 8 /9 /82) that developing 
countries owed $629 billion in 1981, up from  
$252 billion in 1976. "It is certain to be one 
trillion dollars by 1986." The concept 
"trillion", hitherto  confined to astronom y, is 
the US word for one million million 
($ 1,000,000,000,000).
US through the trillion barrier
The debt problem  is not confined to LDCS, 
however. Indeed, the US national debt 
(owned by the governm ent) had already 
passed the trillion figure in O ctober last year 
and could rise by one-third (i.e. by 
$330,000,000,000) by 1984. Alarming as this 
figure is, "the more alarm ing threat to the 
stability of the economy appears to be the 
m ountain  of private debt" in the United 
States, according to Leonard Silk (SM H, 
21/10/81).
The in ternational bankers played a key role 
in erecting this huge debt pyramid. Their 
aggressive search for profits has led to
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widespread evasion of national banking 
regulations, dubious chains of transactions 
through tax havens and other sharp practices. 
One of the biggest Am erican banks, Citicorp, 
is p r e s e n t ly  u n d e r  C o n g r e s s io n a l  
investigation for such activities, while the 
Banco A m brosiano of M ilan has collapsed in 
very murky circumstances. The Vatican Bank 
owes Banco A m brosiano $1.3 billion, but 
refuses to  pay up, leaving hundreds of banks 
in many countries caught with bad debts.
The bankers' irresponsible pursuit of super­
profits, not unknow n in Australia where the 
banks co-operate with tax  evasion and other 
shady deals, is not merely reprehensible. It is 
also very dangerous, raising the ghosts of the 
p a s t ,  w h e n  o v e r - s t r e tc h e d  le n d in g  
precipitated the 1929 Wall Street crash.
Julian Snyder, publisher of the US journal 
International Moneyline, recently warned the 
New York Society of Analysts of menacing 
parallels between today's level of debt and 
that which triggered the 1929 crash.
"There is," he said, "an unmanageable 
am ount of consum er interest debt, a huge 
burden of agricultural debt, a m ountain of 
home m ortgage debt, a huge pyramid of 
business debt, erected on a thin equity base 
and a critical mass of international 
borrowing, resting on a continuing flow of 
credit from  the United States."
Australia's little mountain
A ustralian debt figures are not easy to 
obtain, Year Book Australia warning that its 
figures for public borrowing don 't provide an 
accurate measure of national debt because of 
d u p lic a tio n  an d  o th e  p ro b lem s. But 
Com m onwealth and state governments had 
on issue securities w orth $32,635 million in
1981, $4,652 million repayable in foreign 
currencies.
C orporate debt figures are not easily 
available either, but piecemeal reports of the 
huge am ounts needed to service corporate 
loans suggest tha t the figure is very high, and 
growing. (As this article is written, the big
mining com pany Peko Wallsend reports that 
its borrowings total $209.8 million, 59 percent 
of shareholders' funds. This is not atypical; 
Burns Philp reports an  interest bill of $33.1 
million com pared with a profit o f $9.9 
million.)
Some idea of private debt is provided by the 
to tal advances by A ustralian financial 
institutions which aggregated $64,707 million 
in 1981, divided as follows:
Type of Advances
institution Smillion
Trading banks 21,827
Finance companies 19,293
Savings banks 11,931
Building societies
perm anent 8,286
term inating 1,431
Credit unions 1,801
Instalm ent credit
(O ther than finance cos.) 138
A tolerable m ountain of debt, over $100 
billion owed by governments, corporations 
and consum ers, even if only a Kosciusko 
com pared to the Himalayan peaks owed by 
bigger countries.
Deeper into the red
F urther light is thrown on public and 
corporate debt by the balance of paym ents 
and capital inflow from abroad. In the Fraser 
years, A ustralia has "enjoyed" a to ta l balance 
of paym ents deficit of $27,840 million 
($15,000 million in the last two years), met by 
a huge foreign capital inflow which postpones 
the problem  but worsens it in the long run.
Future dividend payments for foreign 
corporate investors and repaym ent of high 
interest and principal on private and public 
borrowings overseas ensure continued 
recourse to ever-rising borrowings, a spiral of 
debt both corporate and public.
The balance of payments last year
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•Unemployed besiege Liberal HQ
(1981/82) was in the red to  the tune of $9,080 
m illion, a record, while capital inflow 
reached $10,442 million, including $3 billion 
of Japanese money in short-term  investment 
liable to sudden withdrawal a t any time.
5. The contracting market: 
erosion of purchasing power
A third m ajor cause suggested for the 
present recession and  the potential deep 
depression is the decline of purchasing power. 
W riting of the US economy, Leonard Silk 
says:
"Such an erosion of real purchasing power 
has been going on for the past decade. 
M easured in constant 1977 dollars, average 
weekly earnings in private non-agricultural 
industries declined 15.7 percent to  $US 167.21 
in Decem ber 1981 from  $US198.35 in 1973. 
H igh  ta x e s  red u ced  c o n su m e rs ' rea l 
disposable incomes even further .... When
sluggish grow th gives way to  steep recession, 
as it has done now, the drop in purchasing 
pow er worsens, causing sales of durable 
goods such as autos and housing to  plunge, 
threatening depression .... "
A ustralian housing figures have plunged, 
shown by new housing commencements in the 
first three quarters of 1981/82 as com pared 
with those for 1980/81 (see table next page):
This is a fall o f 16 percent over the nine 
m onths period, and not from  a high level. 
New housing commencements for the last 
eight years have never exceeded the level 
attained in 1973/74, although the Australian 
population has grown by 1.6 million, or 17.6 
percent, over this period.
The decline continues, with August 1982 
commencements down to only 8,235 
com pared with the August 1981 figure of 
12,506 — a crashing 29 percent fall.
Car sales are now declining, after keeping
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New housing commencements (000s)
September quarter 
December quarter 
March quarter
1980 1981
28.8 26.3
27.5 22.6
-- 24.0
1982 Change %
— - 8.7
-17.8
184 -23.3
up fairly well — because, it is said, people 
who'd saved to  build a house decided it was 
hopeless and bought a car instead. But that's 
been m opped up and the car industry's future 
is again grim. The same applies to most other 
durable consum er goods, with calamitous 
effects on the whitegoods and associated 
industries.
Consum er dem and has declined despite 
Australian w orkers' relative success in 
resisting seven years of pressure to reduce real 
wages. Reasons for this decline include the 
growth of unem ploym ent (never less than 4.5 
percent during that time), uncertainty thus 
created am ong those still working and the 
effect of high interest rates (which if counted 
in the C PI would have eroded the small 
growth in real wages).
Cutting real wages is central to the 
monetarist-conservative "economic strategy" 
practised m ost consistently in Thatcher's 
Britain, applied with a supply-side twist by 
Reagan and prom ised by Fraser, but not 
prosecuted strongly enough to satisfy his own 
"Drys".
Leading "Dry", John  Hyde of West 
Australia, recently put their case bluntly in a 
Financial Review article summed up in its 
headline: Fraser's Budget error — not enough 
Thatcher. Hyde contrasts the two broad 
strategies to meet the recession adopted by 
capitalist countries. The first is Keynesian 
(''Stim ulate dom estic demand by public 
sector expenditure financed by deficit 
budgets" ), adopted by nations like France, 
Canada and Ireland. That's "Wet"; the proper 
path is:
"Others, of which the UK is the best 
example, have concentrated on m aking their 
economies more efficient .... The British 
approach involves the radical restructuring of 
what was and in some parts .... is still, a very 
flabby British industry. It seeks long-term  
benefits and accepts short-term  costs." (FR, 
3/9 /82 .)
Hyde adds a throwaway line: "It is 
a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  h ig h  l e v e l s  o f  
unemployment", adding that the "wet" 
strategy also leads to high unem ploym ent 
w ithout the benefits lying at the foot of the 
rainbow. "I predict that by the end of the 
depression the UK will be looking better than 
C anada, Ireland or France", he concludes, 
w ithout saying how long the unemployed 
have to wait for the Dry Utopia.
They're only statistics ....
Lofty economic thinkers like M r Hyde 
don 't trouble about mere details such as 
whether the jobless rate is 7 percent or 14 
percent. They're just statistics, not people, 
and anyway "the unemployed are only the 
unemployable". The Dries w on't hesitate to 
sacrifice (other people's) jobs in pursuing the 
chimera of "looking better" when the 
recession ends.
The Hydes of this world find it easy to 
"accept short-term  costs" when som ebody else 
is doing the accepting — in Thatcher's 
Britain, the workers with jobs whose real 
wages are cut and the one in seven jobless. 
This results in reduced dem and, a worse 
recession and unemployment approaching
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"real depression" levels.
It's  no t for w ant o f trying tha t employers 
and the Fraser governm ent have failed to 
reduce real wages. Real wages were cut in 
three of their first six years in office and, 
contrary  to  ceaseless capitalist propaganda 
abou t a "wages explosion", the rise in real 
average weekly earnings was only 2.4 percent 
from  M arch 1975 to  M arch 1981. The after­
tax  wage remained alm ost static, rising a mere
0.7 percent over this period.
Average male weekly earnings (AW E) were 
$151.10 in M arch 1975, com ing down to 
$117.30 after deducting tax  a t the single rate. 
By M arch 1981, AW E was $284 a week, $217 
after tax , BUT the Consum er Price Index had 
risen by 83.6 percent (from  171.1 to  314.2). 
The pre-tax AW E of $284 becomes only 
$154.66 in 1975 dollars, a rise of $3.46 or 2.3 
percent. A fter-tax AW E in M arch 1981 
becomes only $118.17 in 1975 dollars, a rise of 
just 87 cents o r 0.73 percent. Some wage 
explosion!
Wage rates for lower-paid workers — and 
60 percent earn less than  AW E — follow the 
same pattern, with a lesser increase if 
anything.
Wages and profits in Austrlaia
A favorite m onetarist argum ent is that the 
wages explosion results in a declining "share 
of profits", with catastrophic effects on 
investm ent and em ploym ent. M anufacturing 
industry statistics don 't bear out this
argum ent, showing that the "wages share" of 
Value Added in m anufacturing has declined 
from  57 percent in 1920/21 to only 52.2 
percent in 1980/81. (Value Added is the 
surplus added in the m anufacturing process 
after deducting all costs of production  except 
wages and depreciation, so w hat remains after 
these costs is the "share of profits".) The 
table which appears below, pepared from  
official statistics, shows the trend.
A closer look at the m anufacturing 
industry in the Fraser years will show how the 
"wages share" has been pushed down through 
a com bination of hard times, technological 
change and governm ent pressures.
W ould wage cuts 
im prove the economy?
N e v e r th e le s s ,  A u s t r a l ia n  w o rk e rs ' 
stubborn  resistance to  real wage cuts has 
m aintained their living standards at about the
1975 level, instead of falling as in Britain and 
the United States. The key question is: Would 
tne economy be stronger and unemployment 
higher if workers' real wages had dropped by 
about 15 percent as in the United States?
The empirical answer would have to be No. 
The US inflation rate is down to 7 percent and 
the British to  8, com pared with 10 percent 
here, but the Australian unem ploym ent rate is 
only half the British and tw o-thirds of the 
American. If real wages had dropped 15 
percent here, dom estic dem and would have 
dropped by alm ost that much, sales and 
production would be dow n, unem ploym ent
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Year Factories Employment Value Added
000s 000s Smillion
1920/21 17.1 367 220.8
1930/31 21.8 339 236.6
1940/41 27.3 650 515.8
1950/51 43.2 969 1,687.7
1960/61 57.8 1,145 4,349.8
1971/72* 36.2 1,301 9,508.1
1980/81 27.8 1,149 28,475.0
Wages and Salaries
Smillion %age of VA
125.9 57.0
124.9 52.8
275.8 53.5
983.4 58.3
2,289.2 52.6
5,250.0 55.2
14,872.0 52.2
employing less than four workers were
no longer counted in the survey.
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Year Factories Employment Value Added Wages and Salaries
'000s '000s $million Smillion %age of VA
1975/76 27.5 1,200.4 16,555.8 9,472.4 57.2
1976/77 26.8 1,175.8 18,816.1 10,535.8 55.9
1977/78 26.1 1,144.2 19,738.1 11,135.8 56.3
1978/79 26.3 1,143.9 22,230.1 11,966.4 53.9
1979/80 27.4 1,154.2 25,614.0 13,357.5 52.2
1980/81 27.8 1,149.4 28,475.0 14,872.0 52.2
would be worse. The vicious circle would be 
spiralling inwards even more rapidly than it is 
now, with little im pact on "competivity" and 
none on dem and for Australia's m ajor 
exports.
A ustralia is very dependent on the world 
market, particularly  upon Japan , and on 
world prices for raw materials. Australian 
wage rates do not influence world com m odity 
prices nor affect world dem and for Australian 
coal, iron ore, alum ina, and a dozen other 
minerals — or for wheat, wool, meat and 
sugar. Yet the "cut real wages" school of 
economists believe they can overcome the 
effects o f the contracting world m arket on the 
Australian econom y by reducing workers' 
real wages, thus cutting domestic dem and as 
well. Who will buy the commodities then?
6. What does the future hold?
In an article written on the 50th anniversary 
of the Wall Street crash, I tried to analyse the 
economic situation as it was in 1979, coming 
to this conclusion:
"The capitalist system is once again in a 
deep crisis which its controllers do not 
understand and their conventional neo- 
Keynesian wisdom cannot solve. The four- 
year-old recession is obviously very different 
from the 1930s, but in some ways it is more 
serious and potentially worse in its hum an 
consequences." ( Tribune, September 29, 
1979.)
M onetarist policies adopted in place of
Keynesian have not improved things, but 
made them worse. If neither Keynesian nor 
m onetarist solutions can cure the system's ills, 
the future is indeed grim and the difference 
between the thirties and the eighties may not 
be so obvious, while the social consequences 
are horrifying. Before suggesting some ideas 
about future developments and ways of 
fighting the crisis, we should look at some 
current ideas about what is likely to happen.
Despite similarities, world capitalism  in the 
eighties is different from  the capitalism  of the 
thirties, more sophisticated, vastly more 
advanced technologically and capable of 
using com puters and instant electronic 
inform ation for economic planning and 
forecasting. But despite all this, how do the 
experts see the future?
They scarcely inspire confidence even when 
expressing an optimistic view. This is how 
Leonard Silk sees the financial crisis:
"It is far less plausible to write the scenario 
of a world crash now than the m ore boring 
scenario tha t adds up to  m uddling through 
with the probability of a few national and 
banking disasters on the way." (SM H , 
9 /9 /8 2 , emphasis added.)
Sir Jerem y Morse, who presides over the 
big British Lloyds Bank, recently told a 
M elbourne business gathering that "there is a 
five percent risk of a serious collapse of the 
world banking system .... The other challenge 
was the threat of a series of defaults, a chain 
reaction by countries with huge debts." 
(SMH, 6 /10/82.)
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The international banker w asn't quite as 
worried as he might have been, because "he 
was quite convinced the central banks would 
step in to  rescue nations in danger of default, 
despite the inflationary im plications of such 
lifeboat operations." Inflation is fine when it 
is incurred in rescuing bankers' investments!
The banker's m ain worry, however, was 
possible inflation for another aim. "S ir 
Jerem y warned about the possibility of a 
political revulsion against unem ploym ent. He 
said there could be a general move to  the Left 
which would concentrate on reducing the 
num ber o f jobless but prom ote a resurgence 
of inflation."
As to  future prospects, this is how Sir 
Jerem y sees it:
'T h e  short-term  outlook was for a weakish 
recovery in 1983 with the chance of 'continued 
hard tim es' .... there may be a pause in 
recessionary pressures which would allow 
interest rates to be held at present levels or 
even decline."
Even this is a bit optim istic for other British 
capitalists. Observers predict that 3.5 million 
Britons will be jobless by next June, and the 
British C ham ber of Commerce reports 
"evidence of a growing num ber of companies 
closing down because they see no prospect of 
recovery .... " (SMH, 5 /10 /82 .)
The Financial Review editorialist, so 
optim istic a year ago, is now filled with 
foreboding:
"How bad and how long the recession (or 
depression) will be will depend upon the 
world economy, and specifically the US 
economy. So far signs of recovery in the world 
are am biguous and not encouraging. It is not 
a  pleasant prospect." (FR , 8 /10 /82 .)
The prospect is indeed unpleasant for 
w orking people since they are m arked for the 
sack, lower real wages, higher indirect taxes 
and lowered social services, to  get capitalism  
out o f its crisis.
Sacrificing for prosperity
The Financial Review leader-writer spells it 
out:
"As the Governm ent has recognised no 
path to recovery and full employment is 
available to A ustralia w ithout the rest of the 
world. But an acceptance by the community 
as a whole of the inevitability of the fall in 
living standards could cushion the severity in 
employm ent term s of the recession.
'T his m ust involve an acceptance by 
everybody that real personal incomes need to 
fall. N ot profits — this would simply be a self- 
defeating proposition. W hat is wanted is not a 
reduction but a large increase in profits. 
However, personal incomes are a different 
m atter. The greater part of profits is retained 
and invested." (FR, 8 /10/82.)
There are two sorts of income: wages and 
profits (including interest and salaries of 
business executives). If profits are not to fall, 
then it's wages he means, and that's his 
panacea, as already noted. However, there's 
ano ther string to  the bow — higher indirect 
taxes: "A substantial cut in real personal 
incomes could be achieved by a general sales 
tax, or better by some kind of value-added 
tax."
The millionaire, the worker (with or 
w ithout a job) and the pensioner will all 
sacrifice by paying more for the articles of 
consum ption, but the millionaire will get the 
extra profits supposed to come from this. 
Then all the millionaires will reinvest their 
profits, there'll be jobs for all — and the pigs 
will start flying.
What happens to profits?
There are still plenty of profits around. On 
the same day our editorialist dropped his 
pearls of wisdom, his own paper reports the 
following:
"Perth property developer, M r Henry 
Chappie, had taken $2 million out of 
A ustralia when he left for Britain last m onth, 
the West A ustralian Supreme C ourt was told 
yesterday during an action related to writs 
served by the Taxation  Departm ent. The 
Reserve Bank had approved the transfer on 
the basis that M r Chappie was em ig ra ting ...." 
(FR, 8 /10/82.)
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•Furnace worker
M r Chappie, who sold his companies to 
asset-stripper Brian M aher, had a couple of 
million to spare but he's not investing it to  
provide jobs. His fellow sandgroper Robert 
Holmes a 'C ourt used his tax-free $27.5 
million profits from  speculation in Elder 
Smith and Ansett shares to take over a British 
media com pany, providing not one extra job  
in either country.
Many big A ustralian corporations, and 
m ultinationals operating here, have e xported 
their profits — made from Australian 
workers' labor — by switching their 
operations to low-wage Southeast Asian
countries. In the process they "exported" 
A ustralian w orkers' jobs. The whole point 
about profits is that they belong to the 
capitalists, who consume quite a lot and 
reinvest the rest — wherever they can get the 
biggest return. Jobs are secondary.
BHF still makes hundreds of millions in 
profits from  its oil and gas, but won't invest 
these in steel production to m aintain jobs. 
And why? Because there's no profit to  be 
made there, at the present. That's the fallacy 
in the whole argum ent that everyone else must 
suffer except the owers of capital, because 
they alone provide jobs. There is a similar 
flaw in the proposition that lower wages will 
somehow provide more jobs. Quite apart 
from  the problem  of the m arket, employers 
are notorious for their constant desire to 
reduce the num ber of workers, and equally 
notorious for not allowing their hum an 
f e e l in g s  to  o v e r r id e  " e f f i c i e n c y "  
considerations.
This ra ther tedious discussion of the cut- 
wages argum ents is needed because it is now a 
big issue, with many workers grasping for 
some immediate solution to unem ploym ent 
and depression. But acceptance of pay cuts or 
allowing real wages to erode through 
inflation, "sharing the work" or other 
capitalist-inspired solutions would be self- 
defeating, merely reducing living standards 
w ithout providing extra jobs.
7. Fighting the Depression
A deep depression shakes society to  its 
depths, but past experience shows that this 
does not autom atically lead to a swing to the 
left, o r rather that capitalism  may answer this 
by a swing to rightwing extremism and 
violence justified by demagogic promises to 
solve the crisis.
G erm any is the classic case, but similar 
m o v em en ts  m u sh ro o m ed  everyw here, 
including Australia with its New G uard and 
other semi-military fascist groups. History 
won't repeat itself exactly, but extrem e-right
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groupings are spreading and infiltrating 
existing conservative parties.
Even M argaret Thatcher isn 't rightist 
enough for the British ultras, nor is Fraser for 
strong groupings w ithin the Liberal Party, 
particularly in NSW  and W est A ustralia, and 
the N ational Party  in Queensland. If to tha t is 
added the extreme right in the trade unions 
and Labor Party , the big business lobbyists 
who play with the idea of swinging the Labor
Party  to the right o r splitting it, and the 
m ilitarist lobby, there is a potential to r 
regroupm ent of the extreme right which 
would fish in the troubled waters of a long 
Depression.
The working class m ovem ent can best 
answer the rightist th reat by developing its 
own program  to meet the com ing depression 
by dem anding the right to  w ork and 
suggesting ways of creating jobs, alongside its 
defence of w orkers' wages and resisting 
sackings.
Sackings are being resisted, as workers 
challenge the callous attitude of the big 
corporations which are taking advantage of 
the recession to  slash em ploym ent to the 
bone. W ollongong miners and steelworkers,
through the Kemira stay-in and their one-day 
stoppage and protest m arch, have set an 
example tha t will spread.
The trade union movem ent is 100 percent 
correct in defending real wages and living 
standards. It needs, however, to  explain the 
issues very concretely, to  answer the 
fallacious and self-interested argum ents of the 
capitalist class, realising tha t we are now in 
■ a deep crisis of the system. This will not be 
e a s i ly  s o lv e d  by m e re ly  c h a n g in g  
governm ents and economic policies.
'T hey  can 't blame us for the faults of their 
system", declared ACTU president Bob 
Hawke in 1974. W hether he still holds that 
view or not, it rem ains correct. Flowing from  
that, the working class should resist 
vigorously each and every effort to make it 
bear the burden of the system's partial 
breakdown.
The indispensable starting point is to fight
every attack on living standards — on wages 
and hours, but also against sackings; to 
dem and better unem ploym ent and sick 
benefits, pensions and also essential services 
like child care, health and education. But 
resistance is only the beginning. The working 
class should also develop its own program  to 
meet the coming depression, an alternative to 
the capitalist program , one that rejects the 
conventional wisdom that says the profit 
motive is suprem e because it provides the 
jobs.
The Financial Review editorial of O ctober 
8, 1982 puts this view bluntly:
"But there is no solution to  the rapidly 
worsening unem ploym ent rate which does 
not involve the acceptance by the com m unity 
generally that there has to be a substantial 
shift in income shares tow ards profits and 
away from  personal incomes. This is simply a 
matter of how our economic system works." 
(emphasis added)
The obvious retort in the present situation 
is surely: This is simply a m atter of how the 
economic system doesn't work. If this is so, 
then the w orking class response is to advance 
its own idea of the sort o f a system which 
should replace the one that's not working.
Even m ore urgent is to  advance a program  
of action to  meet the needs of the people who 
suffer from  or are threatened by the economic 
crisis, one tha t is no t bound by the dogmas of 
capitalist economics — or socialist dogmas 
either.
The social costs o f depression
Capitalist dogm as are the biggest danger 
here in A ustralia, naturally enough since 
these dogmas dom inate thinking and policy in 
a capitalist country like this. If these dogmas 
stand in the way of providing jobs, let's do 
w ithout the dogmas. The social and hum an 
costs of w orshipping at the altar of the profit 
motive are too high, as the A ustralian Council 
of Social Service has pointed out recently. 
The existence of an average 450,000-strong 
arm y of unem ployed, ACOSS estimates, 
costs the com m unity about $8,000 million
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worth of goods and services unprovided, on 
top of $900 million of lost tax revenue, and 
$1,200 million paid in unemployment 
benefits. That's w ithout counting the 
prostitution, drug-taking and crime caused 
directly or indirectly, the frustration, 
psychological problem s and disruption of 
relationships arising, directly or indirectly, 
from unem ploym ent.
The recent ACTU Federal Unions 
conference, convened to discuss the economic 
crisis, suggested a N ational Employm ent 
Fund to be financed equally by a capital gains 
tax and collection of evaded taxes, on the one 
hand, and workers forgoing half of the tax  cut 
due to operate from  November (about $4 a 
week for workers on AWE). This proposal, 
while only a beginning, is an historic step 
forward in that the national trade union 
movement accepts the responsibility of 
putting forward a plan which offers an 
alternative to policies of both the Fraser 
government and, partially at least, the Labor 
Party.
It differs from  the Labor Party  in that the 
ALP has rejected the idea of a capital gains 
tax, on electoral grounds; it naturally differs 
from the Fraser government which relies on 
"the private sector" and the profit motive. 
The left is somewhat divided on the issue, the 
more traditional rejecting the idea out of hand 
and others suggesting it should be developed 
and strengthened. The latter view seems 
correct, for people everywhere are dem anding 
action to meet immediate problems which 
threaten alm ost every worker.
A workers' program
Strengthening and developing the idea of a 
national program  to create jobs would surely 
involve a more concrete plan to tackle 
economic and social problem s in a different 
way from  that pursued by the corporations 
and Liberal governments. One suggestion 
could be the dem and that federal and state 
governments launch an immediate attack on 
one of the country 's biggest social problems, 
the housing shortage.
This would require the provision of large 
low-interest funds, coming from  public 
money raised for the purpose and also 
obliging banks to provide cheaper funds for 
this specific purpose. It would require 
allocation of crown land and acquisition of 
privately-owned land at reasonable prices, 
expanding the public works labor force and 
com bining this with private construction 
firms.
Such a housing program  would meet a real 
social need, would quickly employ thousands 
of people and provide training for yoqng 
people. M ore, it would stimulate activity in 
dozens of industries supplying goods for 
housing, from  bricks and tim ber to 
alum inium , nails and a thousand other 
products.
It's done for the 'deserving rich'
The hardline free enterprisers will howl that 
this is impossible; "the m arket" m ust be 
allowed to set interest rates and you must 
never give "handouts" to the poor, no m atter 
how deserving. This is claptrap, for special 
low -in terest housing finance is long- 
stablished, thought not always for the poor. 
For example, W ar Service Housing finance 
has always been cheaper than m arket rates, 
while low interest loans are quite com m on for 
politicians, top  public servants and business 
executives.
N C P leader Doug A nthony is one 
politician who got a cheap loan to  buy the 
Canberra house which he later leased to CIA 
a g e n t R ic h a rd  S ta ll in g s . S ir  J o h n  
W esterman, who presides over the A ustralian 
Industries Development C orporation, has a 
$30,000 housing loan at three percent interest 
from  the corporation, and his chief executives 
have loans totalling $500,000. The Sydney 
Morning Herald reports (9 /10 /82) that 
"money m arket talk in Sydney is tha t the chief 
executive of a leading m erchant bank recently 
was granted a $500,000 home loan at an 
interest rate well below m arket levels".
The Overriding needs of providing jobs and 
homes demands that low-interest money be 
found for housing for all, not just for the
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privileged few.
There are m any other urgent social needs 
which could use the creative abilities of all the 
unem ployed, were it not for the artificial 
restrictions imposed by the capitalist 
economic system. These include improved 
public transport, a real national drive to 
develop solar energy, a national network of 
childcare facilities and a real health service 
aimed as m uch at prevention as a t cure. These 
suggestions could be added to , and a concrete 
program  developed for action to  tackle the 
unem ploym ent program .
Instead, the corporate controllers and 
Liberal politicians who run the system do 
nothing but wring their hands and say: "Well, 
the unemployed will just have to  grin and bear 
it until the US econom y recovers" — thus 
clearly showing their bankruptcy.
Developm ent of this type of action 
program  is, I believe, the second and most 
urgent task, hand in hand with resisting 
attacks on the working class.
Control over investment
Any real attack on unem ploym ent will 
require effective controls upon the investment 
policies of the big corporations, controls 
which can only be operated by the national 
governm ent. It will also require an all-out 
a ttack on tax  evasion by corporations and the 
rich, going far beyond either the Fraser 
g o v e rn m e n t's  b e la te d  an d  p o litic a lly -  
motivated partial measures, or the official 
L abor P arty  policy. This latter is hesitant and 
timid about tackling the m ajor issues of 
capital gains, wealth tax and "legal" 
avoidance by corporations and individuals 
which costs $7 billion a year, a t a conservative 
estimate.
Investm ent control would prevent export 
of capital and jobs, direct investm ent into job- 
creating and socially-necessary projects and 
prevent takeovers, speculation and socially 
wasteful but profitable production. The 
"free-market" cham pions will howl again that 
this is "regim entation" , but their precious 
m a rk e t has re g im en ted  h u n d re d s  o f 
thousands onto the industrial scrap-heap.
People must come before profits, the right to 
work before capitalists' "freedom" to  do what 
they like with their profits.
The workers' movem ent should advocate 
public ownership of key strategic industries 
vital to  the economy, and direct their 
resources to  meet people's needs and provide 
jobs. BH P is a case in point; Hurford's 
mistake was not that he advocated taking 
over BHP's ailing steel industry but that he 
did not include its vastly profitable oil and gas 
fields which could subsidise m odernisation 
and m aintenance of steelw orkers'jobs. Such 
public ownership, directed to meeting the 
present crisis, would include workers' direct 
participation — via elected representatives — 
in the operation of the industry, from shop- 
floor to  boardroom .
Labor governments and depression
This raises the im portant issue of the 
serious problems facing a Labor government 
in office during economic crises, which 
happened to the first Labor government after 
W orld W ar I (the Scullin government, elected 
in 1929) and to  the W hitlam government. The 
problem s are real, the pressures will be even 
greater than in 1974/75, the tem ptation to 
seek solutions through co-operation with the 
big corporations on their terms will be 
alluring. Yet there is little prospect for solving 
the eocnomic crisis easily, by better economic 
managem ent or orthodox policies, Keynesian 
or otherwise.
A much m ore radical approach is needed, 
and the left (inside and outside the Labor 
Party) should be striving to  develop its ideas 
and program s, gaining support for them 
am ong working people and encouraging 
intervention by workers in economic 
managem ent from  the workplace upwards. It 
is not sectarian to estimate soberly that the 
dom inant grouping in a Hayden Labor 
government would tend towards a careful, 
orthodox reform ist position, or to suggest 
that an active, inform ed, and m ilitant mass 
movement outside parliam ent will strengthen 
the m ore radical elements in the government.
Just the same, it would avail little if the left
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were merely to  stand aside from  the real 
problems or confine itself to criticising from  
the sidelines and calling for socialism. The 
real difficulties arising from  depression, and 
the hum an suffering caused, requires creative 
new initiatives to develop mass activity to 
fo rce  ra d ic a l p o lic ie s  u p o n  the  big 
corporations and dem and use of the great 
social wealth to  meet people's needs.
The socialist alternative
This is not to  suggest that the socialist 
alternative should be kept in the background 
or soft-pedalled; quite the opposite. 
The causes for the crisis lie within the system 
itself, and these m ust be revealed and 
explained in dow n-to-earth  and vivid terms, 
helping people to understand the forces which 
throw them  onto  the streets and slow down 
the economic life of society. The socialist 
alternative m ust be developed and spread in 
the course of the mass actions which will arise 
more and m ore often as the crisis bears down 
on people.
We should not ignore the difficulties 
created by the problem s in those countires 
which have ended capitalism  and are trying to 
build socialism (or claim they have already 
done so). These include economic as well as 
problems of political institutions, and indeed 
the two are closely related. The very real
econom ic problem s, which also m erit the 
word "crisis", not only of Poland but of every 
such country in varying degree, are deeply 
affected by the capitalist world economy. But 
they have their own internal causes, including 
the basic issues of dem ocracy and self­
m anagem ent, as well as those raised by the 
political and military struggle between the 
two systems.
To adm it this reality is not to  discard 
socialism as the answer to  capitalism 's 
incurable internal problems. On the contrary, 
to ignore the reality or pretend the crisis 
doesn 't exist is a disservice to  the socialist 
cause. The developm ent of a new concept of 
socialism, of a way forw ard from  capitalist 
crisis which does not take the road developed 
in previous times and guided by old dogmas, 
is the only effective answer to  the present 
crisis o f world capitalism.
The m ost effective way to develop a real 
socialist alternative is to work actively, and 
help develop, the mass m ovem ent to  resist 
capitalist solutions for the coming depression 
and to  seek new solutions through struggle. In 
this way, m arxist theory will stim ulate the 
mass m ovem ent's developm ent of a people's 
p rogram  and in turn  develop fu rther its 
concept of socialist society and the paths to  tis 
achievement.
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Confronting the 
Big Australian
— Wollongong response to the steel cuts
—  Mike Donaldson
In August 1982, in the fa ce  o f  m ounting unem ploym ent in the Wollongong region, 
com m unity workers fro m  the City Council and  the Wollongong Workers' Research 
Centre convened a meeting which established the Committee on Em ploym ent (COE) 
covering Wollongong, Shellharbour and Kiama. The fir s t meeting o f  COE was 
attended by sixty people representing thirty com m unity organisations including local 
welfare centres, environm ental groups, Aboriginal representatives, the Communist 
Party o f  Australia and various charitable organisations.
The major impetus behind the comm ittee was a proposalfrom  the Wollongong City 
Council to establish a local developm ent corporation to generate work in the region 
using the Hunter D evelopm ent Board as a m odel Jor the Wollongong corporation.
Com m unity and labor m ovem ent activists, while realising the potentia l o f  such an 
organisation were concerned that it be not dom inated by local business interests. The 
corporation was fo rm ally  established on September 10. A  board o f  about 20 was set 
up: 40 percent fro m  industry and commerce, 20 percent fro m  the trade union 
movement, 20 percent fro m  COE, and 20 percent fro m  local, federal and state 
governments.
The fo llow ing article is based on a discussion paper drafted and circulated by a 
working group o f  the Wollongong Committee on Employment.
It outlines the problem s being confronted by the W ollongong region (and, by 
implication, by other heavily industrialised regions), and also suggests ways in which 
com m unity and union activists can confront the spectre o f  unemployment.
—  Mike Donaldson fo r  the A LR Collective.
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The W ollongong region is in the grip of a 
devastating economic and social crisis.
Since the 1970s, the district has experienced 
am ong the highest rates of unem ploym ent in 
New South Wales and, since April 1981, the 
longest duration  of unemployment for people 
re g is te re d  w ith  th e  C o m m o n w e a lth  
Employment Service (CES). The num ber of 
new registrations has more than doubled, 
while the num ber of vacancies notified to the 
CES has dropped dram atically. People are 
n o w  t a l k i n g  a b o u t  a n  " o f f i c i a l "  
unemployment rate of 12 percent for the 
district. However, following the recent spate 
of closures of m anufacturing establishments, 
and with the next lot of school-leavers ready 
to jo in  the workforce in the next few m onths, 
it is likely that unem ploym ent will hit around 
20 percent by December.
At a recent N ational Unemployment 
Conference, Professor Bob Gregory of the 
Australian N ational University suggested 
that real unem ploym ent in the region might 
already be around 18-19 percent a t a 
conservative estim ate. That is, already there 
are nearly one in five people who would like to 
work but who cannot obtain it. If the official 
figure soars as projected, then we will be 
facing a situation where real unem ploym ent 
will approach one in three of the district's 
workforce.
Why is this happening in Wollongong? 
Coal and steel dom inate the district. Coal 
mining provides em ploym ent for nearly six 
percent of the workforce com pared with a 
national figure of ju st over one percent. The 
steel industry provides jobs for more than a 
quarter of the district's workers — nearly two- 
th i r d s  o f  th e  t o t a l  e m p lo y e d  in  
manufacturing.
T h e  c r i s i s  in te n s i f i e d  w ith  216 
retrenchments a t two British Petroleum - 
owned coal mines, and the announcem ent of 
plans by BH P (owner of the AI&S Steelworks 
at Port Kembla) to  reduce its national steel 
industry workforce by 10,000-15,000.
The district has above the average num ber 
of skilled tradespeople such as m etalworkers 
and electricians. It is, however, under­
represented in professional and supervisory 
"white collar" occupations. The district is 
severely under-serviced in public transport, 
h e a l th  c a r e ,  s e w e ra g e  a n d  p u b l ic  
entertainm ent facilities. The public sector 
provides only about half the rate of 
em ploym ent opportunities in W ollongong 
that it provides nationally.
The proportion  of service sector workers in 
the W ollongong district was 55.7 percent in
1976 — low com pared with the national 
figure of 72.1 percent. This can, in part, be 
explained by the dom inance of m ining and 
m anufacturing activities in the area and the 
fact that control of industry is vested in a few 
very large firms, such as BHP, with control 
fu n c tio n s  (m a n a g e ria l, a d m in is tra tiv e , 
research, clerical) centralised in Sydney, 
M elbourne or London. O ther explanations 
lie with the low level of public sector 
em ploym ent relative to  other m ajor cities, the 
job-displacing technology being introduced 
in the banking, finance, wholesale and retail 
industries, and the difficulty of transferring 
skills from  basic m anufacturing.
BHP's town
A part from  the AI&S steelworks, BHP 
owns or controls several o ther im portant 
lo c a l f irm s  — L y s a g h ts , C o m s te e l ,  
Tubemakers, Titan and A IR — and 50 
percent of the district's collieries. There are 
m any other firms linked to B H P through 
supply or contractual arrangem ents. With 
this level of dom inance, it is obvious that 
BHP's investment decisions have a very great 
im pact on regional em ploym ent levels. BHP's 
d o m in a n c e  is b o th  p o l i t ic a l ly  a n d  
economically im portant. Since the steel 
industry started in the district in 1928, the 
area has depended on the fortunes of this 
industry — and nothing m uch has been done 
to lessen this dependence.
The 1970s saw a considerable restructuring 
and rationalisation of industries on a world 
scale. Federal and state governm ents since the 
m id-1970s have accepted an  economic role for 
A ustralia as a provider of natural resources 
and energy for the Pacific Rim countries
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while allowing "traditional" m anufacturing 
industries to decline.
As capital shifted to energy and minerals in 
search of greater returns, two major 
custom ers of the local steel industry — 
shipbuilding and car m anufacturing — were 
allowed to collapse or contract considerably, 
in line with restructuring policies. BHP's 
pursuit of this strategy seems proven by its 
diversification into oil and gas production, 
mineral exports and, most recently, by its 
a ttem pt to enter alum inium  production.
However, after • several years of not 
investing in its steel division, over the last two 
years BHP has invested more than $650 
m illio n  in u p d a t in g  its  s te e lw o rk s , 
particularly at Port Kembla and Whyalla. 
This investment came after BHP won unique 
concessions in 1981 from the federal 
g o v e rn m e n t, w ith  a v e ry  g e n e ro u s  
depreciation allowance on top of the general 
investment allowances which have operated 
since 1976. One of BHP's most persuasive 
argum ents to obtain these allowances was the 
threat of unemployment in the steel regions. 
BHP used unemployment as an argum ent for 
increased government assistance. BHP is 
currently using the same argum ent to obtain 
assistance via quotas on im ported steel or 
tariff protection.
However, it is not the case that more 
(government-encouraged) investment will 
mean more jobs. BHP investment is labor- 
replacing: the greater the capital investment, 
the fewer the jobs. This is also true for other 
industries in Wollongong: to encourage 
collieries, finance companies and retailers to 
reinvest in the district is one thing, but to 
encourage them  to invest in ways that will • 
create (rather than destroy) jobs is another.
This means that the W ollongong district is 
faced with a massive loss of jobs both in steel 
and associated industries, as well as the retail 
and other service industries that depend on 
steelworkers' and m iners' incomes.
Who are unemployed?
Unemployment particularly affects the
•A  tree grows in W ollongong
young, women, unskilled workers and 
migrants. In a region built around male- 
oriented industries, female unemployment 
has always been a m ajor problem. Because 
"women's jobs" have always been scarce, there 
is a low participation of women in the 
workforce. This means that many women do 
not, or — in the case of married women — 
cannot, register as unemployed. This 
contributes to concealed unemployment, 
estimated to be significant am ong women. 
In s titu tio n a l chan g es and  p o p u la tio n  
increases, bringing about an increased 
participation of women in the labor force, 
were not matched by an ability of the local 
economy to absorb the increase, despite 
increased jobs for women overall. In 1977 it 
was argued that this was why female 
unemployment remained at the high level of 
30 percent.
Increasingly, older workers, particularly
those over 45, are becoming unemployed. 
"Voluntary retirem ent" is aimed at this group 
which is least likely to be given jobs should 
alternatives become available.
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Income support
Individual unemployed people and their 
families have been left in increasing poverty. 
Unemployment benefits were originally 
designed as a kind of short-term  bridging 
finance but the lengthening duration of 
unemployment has m eant that such an 
assum ption is outdated.
The unemployed have been increasingly 
discriminated against com pared with other 
pensioners, with their real standards of living 
deteriorating even further below the poverty 
line. In particular, the plight of the single 
unemployed person is ignored since their 
benefit is not indexed. Prior to the August 
budget increases which will be paid from 
November 1982. The adult benefit was $58.10 
per week, some $16.05 below other single 
pensions, and some $33 below the poverty 
line. (The poverty line is $91.10 for a single 
person.) Unemployed young people are worse 
off again. Their benefit was $36 per week, 
unchanged since 1975. Prices have risen by 
over 98 percent since then, with their income 
slipping some $38 behind other single 
pensioners, and $55 below the poverty line.
This gross discrim ination against the single 
unemployed affects 75 percent of persons on 
unemployment benefits and those single 
people on sickness benefits who are 
transferred from  unem ploym ent benefits.
O ther forms of discrim ination operate 
against all the unemployed. They cannot 
receive any fringe benefits, supplem entary 
rent allowance, or guardian's allowance 
available to o ther pensioners. Although 
difficult to  estim ate, these allowances could 
be worth up to $50 per week. The unemployed 
also face much more stringent income tests 
than other pensioners.
Prior to this present crisis it was estimated 
that 17 percent of the population of 
W ollongong, Shellharbour and Kiama lived 
below the official poverty line. In some 
suburbs the figure is 25 percent. An increasing 
proportion of people seeking emergency relief 
from agencies such as the Smith Family are 
receiving unem ploym ent benefit.
Even those who have not lost their jobs are 
experiencing difficulty. M any workers are
uncertain as to whether their job  will be next 
to go. W orkers who budgeted on receiving 
overtime or double shifts are finding 
themselves financially over-extended. Casual 
work appears to have decreased. Some 
workers in small firms are being asked to 
defer wages to save their jobs. Small 
businesses are experiencing a considerable 
drop in sales and income.
Responses elsewhere
W ollongong's situation is not unique: 
similar crises have occurred, and are 
occurring in the United States, C anada, the 
United Kingdom, Europe and other parts 
of A ustralia. To reduce unem ploym ent and 
revitalise urban areas, initiatives have already 
been taken in many of these places and the 
experience gained provides a valuable lead to 
the direction that should be taken here.
Over the past twenty years, the main 
approach to economic developm ent of urban 
areas has relied on the private sector to restore 
the inner-city em ploym ent base. The aim  has 
been to generate em ploym ent through 
policies which directly affect business costs 
and profits but which do not encroach on 
employee earnings, jo b  security, working 
conditions or job  control. Such policies 
assume tha t companies respond to measures 
aimed at reducing costs and increasing 
profitability and that, as a result, existing jobs 
will be retained, new jobs will be created and 
local workers and com m unities will benefit.
U r b a n  r e n e w a l  p r o g r a m s  w e re  
implemented in the 1950s and 1960s in the 
United Kingdom, N orth America and parts of 
Europe. A lthough intended to  help depressed 
inner-city com m unities, the program s were 
often used (by local authorities, developers 
and financial organisations) to "modernise" 
inner-city areas with new com m ercial and 
office developm ent, forcing form er residents 
to move to other areas w ithout com pensation. 
Despite the vast scale of some of the projects, 
there is little evidence suggesting that urban 
renewal has succeeded anywhere in term s of 
creating employment.
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Renewal problems
In response to the problem s created by 
urban renewal and the unrest of the 19603, 
some projects were reoriented towards 
rebuilding (rather than removing) the inner- 
city economic and com m unity base. Founded 
on the belief that governm ent intervention 
would lead to revitalisation, governments in 
the UK, North America and Australia used a 
range of measures to make city areas more 
attractive for private firms.
The payment of capital subsidies towards 
buildings or provision of cheap land for 
selected development (usually m anufact­
uring), reductions in taxes (particularly 
payroll tax), and reductions in service costs 
(gas, electricity, freight and com m unication) 
have been widely used with mixed success. Of 
these, reduction in taxes is probably the most 
significant.
Employment subsidy program s aim at 
encouraging employers to take on or retain 
existing employees. In the UK, employment 
subsidy program s have been widely used and 
include the Tem porary Employment Subsidy 
(6 m onths subsidy payable to employers who 
deferred a redundancy of 10 or more 
workers), Youth Employm ent Subsidy 
(payable to employers who recruit young 
people under 20 unemployed for 6 m onths or 
more), Com m unity Industry Program , 
Special Tem porary Employment Program  
(project work for long-term unemployed 
persons 18 years and over), and the 
T e m p o r a r y  S h o r t  T im e  W o r k in g  
Com pensation Scheme. Program s are also 
operated in Europe and New Zealand.
On balance, it seems that employment 
subsidy program s are beneficial in terms of 
retaining or creating jobs. The M anpower 
Services Commission in the UK estimated 
that, in late 1980, about half the total num ber 
of employm ent subsidy schemes represented a 
net increase in employment. The advantage of 
a subsidy program  is that it can be directed to 
particular disadvantaged areas or groups, or 
to labor-intensive industries.
Employment subsidy program s have not 
been adopted in Australia because of the 
present federal governm ent's "philosophical 
reservations" about job-creation schemes. 
The governm ent is, instead, pursuing a policy 
of "fighting inflation first" in the belief that 
this will increase employm ent opportunities 
by strengthening economic activity. Increases 
in unem ploym ent suggest that such a strategy 
is not effective and that measures which offer 
some reduction in the numbers unemployed 
and the length of time they spend in 
unemployment should be implemented.
Training schemes
T ra in in g  schem es, in c lu d in g  w ork  
ex p erien ce  p ro g ra m s  an d  tra n s i t io n a l  
education from  school to  work, aim to 
increase the "employability" of the workforce 
and are operated in most countries. While the 
program s may help selected people obtain 
new skills, they do nothing to help overall job  
availability. Unless accompanied by an 
increase in the num ber of jobs available, 
training schemes may only change positions 
of people in the unem ploym ent queue, but do 
not reduce its length.
In the US, UK and Australia, business and 
technical assistance to new and to relocating 
firms is provided, generally through some 
form of agency, a t the state, regional or local 
level. These agencies are usually public (e.g. 
the NSW  Small Business Agency attached to 
the D epartm ent of Industrial Development 
and D ecentralisation, or local authority  
departm ents) or quasi-public authorities (e.g. 
the regional enterprise agencies in Britain 
comprising representatives of industry, banks 
and unions and backed by larger local 
com panies, or the Economic Development 
C orporation in the US.)
The construction of housing and other 
facilities was the m ajor basis for the new town 
program s in the UK and US but not in 
Australia. Such schemes are highly capital- 
intensive, however, with little prospect of pay­
back. A public works program  (e.g. the RED 
scheme) provides employment but only on a 
short-term  basis.
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The provision of nursery factories has 
proved successful in some places. In past 
years, considerable attention has been given 
to the developm ent of "science parks" as a way 
of attracting high-technology industry. 
However, a recent study in Britain found that 
new small high-technology companies do not 
need sophisticated factories in science parks, 
but small premises, often in old converted 
buildings, with easy tenancy terms. It was also 
found that few science parks are successful in 
real estate investment terms and that they 
have a low level of interaction with 
universities even when located close to them.
Support schemes
In the UK, schemes providing both space 
and supporting services to small firms have 
been implemented to encourage new 
ventures. The impetus for these schemes has 
come from  local councils, local enterprise 
trusts, or the private sector (e.g. British Steel 
and the Clyde W orkshops). The concept of an 
"innovation centre" has recently been put into 
practice in the city of Hull in Britain. The 
centre was set up by the local council to 
encourage and assist small firms, especially 
new ventures. F or initial nominal charges, the 
cen tre  m akes a v a ila b le  f lo o r  space, 
engineering staff and a well-equipped 
machine shop, electronics equipm ent, plastics 
machinery, operations support, technological 
advice and other sources of advice, education 
and help. Clients, when established, move out 
to  commercial premises, some of which are 
also provided by the City Council.
In the UK, Europe, North America and, to 
a lesser extent, A ustralia, there is an  array  of 
programs, available which have been used to 
encourage private firms to  remain, locate or 
e x p a n d  in  a r e a s  o f  h ig h  u r b a n  
unemployment. Frequently, some form  of 
organisation or agency has been established 
to co-ordinate or implement these program s 
at the local or regional level.
Generally, the approach of all these 
organisations is to  try to improve the 
conditions for private business in urban areas.
This traditional approach, however, has
h ad  m ix ed  re s u l ts .  E c o n o m ic  a n d  
unem ploym ent problem s in many inner 
urban areas remain and, in some cases, have 
worsened rather than im proved. Several 
reasons have been put forward to explain this:
(1) Insufficient resources have been allocated 
to  developm ent activities and those resources 
made available have either not been targeted 
to depressed or low income areas, or where 
targeting has been intended, it has been 
ignored.
(2) The proliferation of organisations/ 
agencies has m eant that an increasing num ber 
of organisations is com peting for the 
relatively small num ber of private sector jobs 
available.
(3) Studies in the US have shown that private 
sector investment or location decisions are 
not really affected by financial incentives. 
Technology is, to some extent, reducing the 
significance of location while training 
program s tend to  redistribute ra ther than 
increase employment.
(4) Even when jobs have been created they 
have not always been stable or good ones and 
have not always gone to local residents. 
Unless a com m unity or a developm ent 
corporation  gains some degree of ownership, 
or equity, in a firm (thereby ensuring some 
check on managem ent decision-m aking) in 
return for financial or other assistance, jobs 
created may turn  out to be short-lived, low- 
paid, poor quality a n d /o r  not directed 
towards local residents.
Given that private enterprise is about 
providing the best return on money invested, 
and that creating jobs is not a profitable 
activity, financial incentives would have to be 
very large before employers would consider 
relocating or expanding workplaces. It needs 
to be considered whether this is the best use of 
limited governm ent resources. M oreover, 
relocation of firms frequently does not do 
much more than move jobs from  one place to 
another — one area's gains are another's 
losses. Traditional approaches of prom otion, 
financial and other incentives aimed at 
encouraging firms to  relocate are subject to 
this criticism and, therefore, may be regarded
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as a waste of public money.
As it is increasingly being accepted that few 
firms wish to relocate and little footloose 
industry remains, a change of emphasis is 
occurring overseas — from attracting  outside 
industry, to encouraging establishm ent and 
expansion of local firms and enterprises.
Non-planning approaches
The "non-planning" approach is based on 
the belief that there should be least possible 
interference in the m arket system. Whereas 
traditionalists argue that some government 
intervention is necessary to make inner-cities 
competitive with other areas to  a ttract private 
firms, non-planning advocates argue that 
governm ent intervention will not restore 
depressed areas and, therefore, expenditure 
of governm ent resources in these areas is 
wasteful. Instead, it is argued, depressed areas 
should be allowed to die, and poor and 
unemployed residents should move to places 
where there are jobs.
"Enterprise zones" have been established in 
a num ber of cities in the UK and US in an 
attem pt to  a ttract private sector jobs to  inner 
areas. An enterprise zone is an area with 
minimal (or zero) regulation, taxation, 
planning controls, wage and social security 
c o n s t r a i n t s  a n d  o th e r  g o v e r n m e n t  
"interference". In four vears. 11 zones have 
been established in Britain and some fairly 
extravagant claims have been made about the 
jobs that have been created. Enterprise zones 
offer a way of reducing public spending, 
creating a climate for further deregulation 
and decreasing governm ent activity — an 
appealing alternative to a conservative 
governm ent committed to private enterprise 
and the free market.
Community-based approaches
In recent years, governm ents have given 
much greater attention  to  com m unity-based 
approaches to job  creation and economic 
developm ent but public sector financial 
support still remains far below that given to 
m ore traditional approaches.
The com m unity approach believes that 
traditional incentives to  private business are 
ineffective, i Private capital is often not 
a ttracted  to  depressed areas because of the 
inability of firms to take into account social 
needs and social returns (e.g. from  reduced 
welfare benefits through job  creation) and the 
tendency to focus on returns to capital rather 
than jobs. Even when incentives do influence 
a particular firm , local workers and 
com m unities do not necessarily benefit 
because the jobs created are often poor, low- 
paid and offer little prospect of career 
advancement.
W hat is needed, therefore, is not a 
strengthening of private investment, but a 
restructuring of the local economy under a 
different system of control to ensure stable, 
c a re e r-s tru c tu re d , re a so n a b ly  w ell-paid  
employment.
Free m arket "non-planning" approaches 
are also rejected since the operations of the 
m arket economy are the m ajor cause of the 
problem s in the first place. Instead, local or 
com m unity contro l over local economic 
d e v e lo p m e n t is n e c e s s a ry  to  a v o id  
exploitation and control of local residents 
through businesses owned by "outsiders"
As unem ploym ent is usually concentrated 
where housing and building is old and often 
inadequate, health standards are low and 
local services are poor, the com m unity 
approach advocates expansion of enterprises 
designed to improve these conditions and to 
c r e a te  a n d  d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - c o n t r o l  
employment. Some of the mechanisms used 
at the com m unity level to prom ote economic 
developm ent are described below.
(1) Community Development 
Corporations (CDC)
These are non-profit, neighborhood- 
oriented organisations which, acting as 
locally-controlled development agencies, try 
to integrate com m unity, economic and 
physical development.
CDCs aim  to bring jobs, stability and 
p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  to  d i s a d v a n ta g e d
Unemployment 25
communities. M any have been set up in the 
US, funded mainly by the federal government 
and foundation gifts/loans. These funds 
provide operating finance and venture capital 
and have enabled the establishm ent of a CD C 
legal centre, a business advisory firm , a 
training institute, a research centre and an  
advocacy organisation. The CD C boards are 
comprised mainly of com m unity residents 
and are held accountable to local people (the 
CDC "members") through, for example, 
regular elections.
Urban CD Cs usually serve neighborhoods 
of just over 100,000 people. However, they 
vary enorm ously in size and resources. One of 
the biggest is TELA CU  (The East Los 
Angeles Com m unity Union) which has 300 
full-time staff, undertakes investments for 
p ro fit, opera tes neighborhood  cred it/ 
b a n k in g  se rv ices , p ro v id es  tech n ica l 
assistance to  local businesses, undertakes 
com m unity planning, provides employment 
and training services, housing services, runs a 
food co-op, and sponsors cultural activities.
(2) Minority Venture Development
The last ten years has seen increasing 
assistance for the development of ethnic 
m inority enterprises in the US, firstly, 
because evidence suggests that m inority 
owners can provide more jobs for people of 
their ethnic group than other employers and, 
secondly, because they are more likely to 
lo ca te  th e ir  b u s in ess  in  a m in o rity  
community.
The M in o rity  E n te rp rise  B usiness 
(M ESBIC) O rganisations identify and assist 
new ventures while services are provided by 
CDCs and other com m unity organisations. 
Funding comes from  various federal and state 
government agencies and, once established, 
minority firms are given governm ent 
preference when tendering for contracts.
As yet, few large-scale enterprises are 
totally-owned by m inority groups in the US, • 
but sufficient acquisitions of banks and other 
lending institutions, media (radio, TV, film, 
newspapers), and pharm aceutical firms have 
produced many jobs for low-income earners.
(3) Consumer and Producer (worker- 
owned) Co-operatives
(a) Community co-operatives have been 
formed in the US with some governm ent and 
foundation assistance in areas which include: 
manufacturing, energy, recycling, food 
purchasing and distribution, gardening, park 
restoration/developm ent and creation of 
"urban forests", housing rehabilitation and 
development.
The National Co-operative Bank was 
formed in the US in 1980 to assist com m unity 
co-operatives. The bank provides special help 
to potential borrowers and clients ranging 
from  solving initial establishm ent problem s 
to actual operations assistance.
Special technical assistance agencies 
funded by federal, state and local money have 
also been set up to help com m unity groups 
f o r m  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  to  u n d e r t a k e  
housing projects, training program s, etc.
Action to provide co-operatives has also 
been taken in Australia. Initiatives include:
the establishm ent in 1981 of the 
V ictorian Co-operative Developm ent 
Program  by the then State M inistry for 
E m p lo y m en t an d  T ra in in g . The 
program  aims to establish self-sufficient 
co-operative business enterprises. At 
the present time, 19 co-operative 
business activities are either operating 
o r being form ed. The m inistry has also 
funded a service infrastructure;
the planned developm ent by a num ber 
of local governm ent authorities (e.g. 
Broken Hill) o f Local Co-operative 
D ev e lo p m en t A gencies (L C D A s) 
sim ilar to those in Britain where over 30 
have been established in the last three 
years (working with some 500 new co­
operatives). LCDAs provide essential 
technical expertise "on the spot" for 
local co-operative developm ent. In 1978 
the NSW  government established a 
fund of $3 million in conjunction with 
an  advisory team of personnel to  help 
develop co-operatives (the W orker Co­
operative Developm ent Agency).
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(b) Worker Ownership, that is workers 
buying or taking over a firm, is a recent 
phenomenon in the US and generally occurs 
where a large corporation decides to close or 
abandon an existing plant.
Generally, employees form a board of 
directors and hire managers to help them. US 
government money has been used to research 
possible ventures and government loan 
guarantees and subsidies may be obtained if 
the venture is proved to be feasible and non­
government capital is available.
(4) Industrial conversion
This is usually an employee initiative, the 
m ost w ell-know n ex am p le  being the 
intervention campaigns by Lucas Aerospace 
workers in Britain. Unions at Lucas 
Aerospace, fighting massive layoffs and 
closed factories in the depressed British 
aerospace industry, drafted a "Corporate 
Plan" detailing 150 new, more socially-useful 
products which Lucas could develop instead 
of laying off workers.
In Britain, similar initiatives have followed 
in many industries such as machine tools, 
motor cars, power engineering and aerospace. 
The same approach is also being applied by 
jo in t  u n io n -c o m m u n i ty  a c t io n  g ro u p  
coalitions in several areas of Britain such as 
Tyneside, Coventry and the London 
Docklands.
It is difficult to evaluate community-based 
approaches since many institutions are new. 
Also, funding has been small compared with 
that for traditional approaches. However, 
fairly large job-creating developments have 
taken place and reasonable quality jobs have 
been created in economically-depressed 
areas. CDCs now tend to go into joint 
ventures with private entrepreneurs because 
of problems of finance and management 
experienced in some wholly-owned CDC 
enterprises. There is also the problem that 
some CDCs have not always remained 
accountable to the local community.
The im portance of com m unity based 
approaches is that they stress job  quality, 
targeting of employment and benefits to local
communiLiess, worker and community 
involvement in development, the need lor 
social costs and benefits to be taken into 
account in investment decisions, and the need 
for decentralised, non-bureaucratic and 
democratic structures.
Local responses in W ollongong
In March this year, Wollongong City 
Council began a program to look at ways ol 
g e n e r a t in g  a n d  p re s e rv in g  jo b s  in 
Wollongong. Some activities undertaken as 
part of this program include:
•an  urban structure study (being carried 
out by a consultant team) to identify 
possible locations for new industrial 
and tourism developments among a 
range of other considerations;
•formulation of a tourism strategy;
• a  study to identify firms linked w ith the 
steel industry and areas for possible 
product diversification;
•  in d u s t r ia l  p ro m o t io n  aim ed at 
attracting industry to the area;
• a  program to limit "escape spending" 
from the area and the development of a 
"buy locally" policy;
• a  request for the reintroduction of the 
RED scheme.
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On July 30, the council, recognising the 
seriousness of the situation regarding 
unemployment in the area and the need for a 
community response, convened a meeting of 
representatives of industry, government, 
unions and the community to establish a 
committee or corporation for employment 
generation.
A number of initiatives have been taken by 
the labor movement.
(a) the Federated Ironworkers Association 
(FIA) held a series of public meetings on the 
steel industry in several local centres and the 
Wollongong Town Hall. The union is also 
heavily involved in a campaign to prevent any 
further job  losses in the industry;
(b) the South Coast Trades and Labor 
Council set up a special committee to discuss 
unemployment and job creation in the area 
and possible union action. The council also 
o r g a n i s e d  a t w o - d a y  s e m i n a r  on  
unemployment in September;
(c) the South Coast District of the 
Communist Party  has been holding meetings 
between trade union militants and party 
activists from the national level of the CPA as 
well as from Newcastle. At the national level, 
discussions are being held between people 
from steel and coal districts throughout 
Australia.
(d) the Combined Pensioners Association of 
New South Wales held a rally at the Sydney 
Town Hall in August. The association 
launched a broadly-based Campaign for 
Socia l Ju s t ic e  w hich  will focus on 
unemployment.
Much of the neighborly and family support 
of people forced into unemployment remains 
unreported. This support is essential in 
lessening the personal tragedy of losing a job  
and sharing the burden of decisions which 
need to be made a t that time. Sharing excess 
home-grown vegetables, shopping trips and 
social activities can buffer the inevitable 
impacts of unemployment.
A number of locality-based projects have 
been initiated or proposed:
— bulk buying of, food and other
household items; community vegetable 
gardens; shared poultry ventures; contracting 
of maintenance and repair work on 
community buildings to local unemployed; 
local tool and workshop co-operatives for 
home repair and production; buying locally 
produced products or buying from local 
stores.
Future directions
In difficult times, people commonly 
withdraw into self-protection, or wait and 
hope that the government will do something, 
or something will change for the better. The 
current efforts to create jobs and provide 
incom e f ro m  a l te rn a t iv e  sou rces  a re  
inadequate, but to deny personal capacity to 
do something about unemployment, for 
whatever reason, is perhaps the greatest 
danger.
Without broad-based involvement in 
fighting unemployment and developing a co­
ord ina ted  response, the risk is tha t  
governments will restrict participation to 
"experts" and those whose experience of 
employment has been stable and rewarding. 
Implementation of proposals that are 
government and expert-generated often meet 
strong resistance because they are seen as yet 
another imposition promising, a t  best, limited ' 
su c c e ss  o r  f a i l u r e .  W i th  r e s t r i c t e d  
participation, details of the impact of the 
current situation and the effectiveness of 
proposals will be overlooked. Governments 
will be inadequately informed to take 
effective action and the ideas and energy of 
"non-experts" will likely be lost, particularly 
putting small-scale and local initiatives at risk 
or nipping them in the bud.
Those people who are particularly 
vulnerable, or traditionally excluded from 
employment, will possibly be ignored 
(particularly the young and the over-45-year- 
olds, the physically handicapped, Aborigines, 
women and migrant groups) and their needs 
discounted in subsequent job  creation unless 
their views are actively solicited.
An opportunity to build an  effective 
consensus or coalition on this critical issue
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will be sacrificed and the region be further 
divided — between right and left, rich and 
poor, employed and unemployed, able- 
bodied and disabled — unless there is a 
p o sitiv e  co m m itm en t to  b u ild in g  a 
representative body to  develop a truly 
regional response.
Most economic decisions are made at 
national and international levels. The 
prospect of people from  the W ollongong area 
having significant influence in these arenas is 
limited. Concerted local action, however, can 
begin to modify the way these decisions affect 
the region and initiate and support local 
endeavours which will be significant locally 
and form  the basis of longer-term change in 
the economy.
A possible plan of action
The com m unity needs to work out what 
program s it wants, how they should be run 
and who will run them , what funding is 
needed, how those resources can be obtained, 
what other m ovem ents/groups will give 
support, and how, and so on. The following 
are some of the things that should be 
considered:
(1) a community-based approach to economic 
development rather than a total reliance on 
private capital.
People live in neighborhoods, not cities; it 
is in neighborhoods tha t people's investment, 
em otional as well as economic, is situated. An 
economic development program  must build 
on the determ ination of a neighborhood's 
own residents to stay and make the 
com m unity livable. Residents know their 
needs better than a private investor and also 
are more aware of the best way to  satisfy those 
needs.
(2) small-scale initiatives
Small-scale initiatives tend to be more 
participatory and accessible to local residents 
and are more likely to  have a com m itm ent to 
the area and to reinvest funds locally. The 
council should:
•ad o p t a policy of prom oting and
assisting the developm ent of small-scale
and local initiatives;
•press for the location in the city of a 
perm anent office for the Small Business 
Development Agency and the W orker 
Co-operative Development Agency, 
and
•  j o i n  w i t h  l o c a l  c o m m u n i t y  
organisations in a "partnership" to 
e s ta b l is h  a L o ca l C o -o p e ra tiv e  
D evelopm ent Agency (e.g. as in 
Blacktown, NSW).
(3) locally accountable developm ent 
structures
The establishm ent of a local development 
structure such as a democratically-elected 
Com m unity Developm ent C orporation, with 
an entrepreneurial role, could help to build 
new resources tha t will strengthen the 
com m unity internally and in its relations with 
the outside world. The corporation would be 
accountable to local people (its "members") 
and any profits made ploughed back into 
com m unity services or the development of 
new enterprises.
(4) community reinvestment
The revitalisation of the W ollongong 
com m unity requires institutional changes 
which will reduce the outflow of com m unity 
resources, be they capital, labor or consum er 
expenditures.
With respect to  capital, at the present time a 
significant proportion  of the money earned in 
this district is being invested outside the area. 
C om m unity action against "redlining" in the 
US was an influential factor in the passing of 
the US Com m unity Reinvestment Act which 
provides a legal mechanism for forcing 
accountability in local financial institutions.
To limit "redlining" in this district it is 
necessary to investigate how much capital is 
flowing out of the area and work for its 
redirection into housing loans here, and work 
with local governm ent and other groups to 
dem and a quid pro  quo: a bank can hold 
public deposits and make a resulting profit, 
but only if they pledge to provide additional 
credit to areas which they are supposed to be 
serving.
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Fast food chains and chain superm arkets 
also export capital from  the area: profits, debt 
service and m anagem ent costs are paid to 
headquarters ra ther than locally. Some of this 
leakage could be plugged if buildings were 
owned locally, m anagem ent hired from  local 
residents and supplies purchased locally.
(5) conditional financial assistance 
to private enterprise
The use of traditional financial and other 
incentives to a ttrac t or expand private 
business does not necessarily create jobs, and 
where jobs have been created they are not 
necessarily good jobs, or stable. As the 
offering of such incentives is a possibility in 
this area, it should be a condition that, in 
return, local authorities and state and federal 
governments negotiate agreements regarding 
employment and m anpow er training or a 
share in equity.
(6) quality o f employment
T here  a re  tw o sides to  eco n o m ic  
development:
(1) the creation of new additional jobs
(2) the creation of better jobs — stable 
employment offering a reasonable wage, and 
work satisfaction through variety and a 
responsibility for decision-taking.
In w orking for these things, labor 
movement cam paigns should be supported 
for:
• a  reduction of working hours in 
existing industries, to share out the 
n ecessa ry  w o rk , b u t w i t h o u t  a 
corresponding reduction in incomes, so 
that effective dem and can be increased;
•a  m oratorium  on job  losses in the steel 
industry to  spread the effect of the 
m odernisation program  over a longer 
period of time;
•a  dem ocratisation of power and an 
increased participatory role for workers 
in m anagem ent decision-making.
(7) socially useful production
The aim  should be to  produce goods and 
services tha t are socially useful to the
com m unity. Enterprises such as solar energy 
generation and recycling are two areas that 
offer financial and environm ental benefits 
and the potential of substantial jo b  creation.
Support should be given to any proposals 
for alternative socially-useful products put 
forw ard by workers as a counter to 
m anagem ent moves for closures and 
redundancies.
(8) co-operative I community I business 
education and training
There is an increasing recognition that 
education, both form al and inform al, plays 
an im portant role in local developm ent and 
that this role could be strengthened. 
Education and local developm ent need to be 
linked; education and training program s 
w ithout jobs at the end are a recipe for 
frustration and disillusionment.
T he a im  o f e d u c a tio n  an d  loca l 
developm ent m ust be the creation of more 
effective ways of improving the life chance 
and living conditions of urban residents who 
still live in what can only be called poverty.
To be effective, education program s must 
ensure that there is not a specific type of 
education for "disadvantaged people"; 
education for developm ent must be education 
for all.
Similarly, education and training program s 
must relate to the com m unity — its resources, 
needs and problems — and help people to 
alter their situation.
(9) continuous funding
It is essential that there is adequate and 
stable funding available. A C om m unity C o­
operative Bank or Venture D evelopm ent 
Bank could provide capital to  new ventures 
directly and indirectly via low interest 
guaranteed loans through commercial banks.
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The myth of the 
mainstream
—  Ray Southall
In  M ay 1982, the  C o m m o n w e a l t h  
D epartm ent of Education published a paper 
entitled Towards a National Language Policy 
"to stimulate debate on language policy" and 
to call attention to  the "pressing needs for 
research and surveys on language use and 
language learning in A ustralia". The paper 
proposed "that the time is right for the 
developm ent of a coherent and co-ordinated 
policy on languages in Australia" and that to 
achieve such a policy "changes may have to  be 
made to  the education system".
The fundam ental issues which the paper 
poses are those considered in the Australian 
Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs 
report, Multiculturalism fo r  A ll Australians: 
Our developing nationhood, which also 
appeared in May of this year. O f these, the 
most im portant is clearly that concerning 
A ustralian identity, towards which the 
attitude of the Com m onwealth D epartm ent 
of Education paper is that expressed in the 
notion of "the m ainstream  culture", of which 
English is accepted as the vehicle and as the 
m other tongue of those of Anglo-Celtic 
origin.
There is nothing contentious, of course, in 
the claim tha t English is the m other tongue of 
those of English origin, but there are many 
varieties of English, of which A ustralian 
English, with its own sub-varieties, and what 
for brevity's sake may be called S tandard 
English are only two. S tandard  English, from 
which A ustralian English is commonly 
judged to diverge and in doing so to gain its 
A ustralian character, is not the m other 
tongue of the English. The language of 
Newcastle-on-Tyne, for example, shows a far 
greater divergence from Standard English 
than does A ustralian English, as also does the 
English of m any other regions of the United 
Kingdom. For most people in the United 
Kingdom, S tandard English is a lingua 
franca, a second language which proves as 
difficult for native English speakers to 
acquire, irrespective of w hether they are 
natives of England or Australia, as French or 
German.
A ttention to  the varieties of language, 
which is frequently avoided by referring to 
standard forms, emphasises that many 
A ustralian im m igrants did and do speak a
Mainstream? 31
patois/ dialect which embodies a culture quite 
distinct from  that of any standard form. A 
national language policy, therefore, needs to 
have special regard to the m other tongue, 
where this is patois, and to  the relationship of 
this to any regard for the standard form. 
Policy decisions in this area are necessarily 
decisions as to the worth of the culture which 
a language transm its and the Com m onwealth 
D epartm ent o f Education paper appears 
surprisingly insensitive to  this in accepting 
that the m other tongue of those of Celtic 
origin is English.
That English is the Celtic m other tongue is 
not perhaps as provocative an assum ption in 
A ustralia as it would be in the United 
Kingdom, where there is a long and bitter 
history of struggle against the repression of 
Celtic languages and culture. It is, however, 
an assum ption that those, especially the Irish, 
who were transported  to or who migrated to 
A u s tra lia  in  co n seq u en ce  o f E ng lish  
s u b j u g a t i o n  a n d  w h o  c o n t r i b u t e d  
significantly to  the form ation of the present 
identity and culture of A ustralia, had 
surrendered to the repression of their cultural 
heritage on their arrival in Australia. The 
historical situation seems rather to have been 
that the English colony showed no more 
respect than the "m other country" for Celtic 
culture and the necessity for Celtic languages 
to the transm ission of that culture "from 
generation to  generation".
This particular instance of neglect calls 
attention to the need not simply to m aintain 
but actively to  prom ote languages which are 
the means of access to the culture of origin 
and hence to restore to A ustralian people 
their cultural heritage. It is a m ajor oversight 
of the Com m onw ealth D epartm ent of 
Education paper that it fails to address itself 
to the establishm ent of an inalienable right to 
cultural inheritance.1 This right m ust surely 
be the foundation stone of any national 
language policy in a m ulticultural society.
The extent to  which the right of cultural 
inheritance can be exercised will depend upon 
the facilities made available to that end and 
hence upon the priorities which govern the 
disbursement of public funds in this area. It is
because this is so tha t access to  language 
becomes a m atter of policy. Language policy 
in A ustralia, it seems to be conceded, will be 
m u lticu ltu ra lis t, thereby  reflecting  the 
growing acceptance of the nature of 
A ustralian society. Consequently it becomes 
imperative to call into question the notion of 
"the m ainstream  culture" which inform s the 
Com m onw ealth D epartm ent of Education's 
discussion paper and tha t for reasons other 
than its disregard of Celtic claims to 
consideration.
Multiculturalism
W hile a m ulticulturalist view of the 
A ustralian identity does not deny the 
im portance of the English contribution , it 
m ust surely define the m ainstream  of A ustral­
ian life as the expression of the in teraction of 
many cultures, each of which is essential in 
that w ithout it A ustralian life would not be as 
it is. It is this interaction that gives our way of 
life its A ustralian identity. The argum ent for 
this view is not that this interaction should 
take place but that it unavoidably does so and 
that by being acknowledged and welcomed it 
can become of still greater benefit in 
sharpening and enriching the perception of 
w hat it means to  be A ustralian.
It is believed in some quarters tha t such a 
perception implies a passive acceptance of 
A ustralian life as it is. M ulticulturalism , 
however, is not inconsistent with the pursuit 
of cultural change and does not require us, for 
instance, simply to accept chauvinism , 
racism , sexism and the com m ercialisation of 
every nook and cranny of our way of life. 
W hat it is inconsistent with is the assum ption 
that such things can be understood and 
overcome w ithout regard to  their cultural 
context.
W hat national language policy necessarily 
involves is planned change, facilitated by 
regulation of access to  cultural context. As 
th e  C o m m o n w e a l t h  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
Education paper observes,
In so far as different cultural and sub­
cultural groups embody in their languages 
different meaning potentials, [it is] the
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continued use and life of these languages 
[which] enables the transmission of cultural 
values, modes of thought and world views 
from generation to generation.
Consequently, by making the language of one 
cultural group more generally accessible 
changes can be effected in its traditional 
values, thinking and outlook. The wider 
political implications of this prospect need to 
be well aired in the debate on language policy. 
One implication, for instance, is that in 
circumstances in which governm ent is 
inclined to  repress the language and culture of 
a particular "group", its own perception of its 
best interests may be better served by making 
that language and culture more susceptible to 
outside influence.
In many cases, one such outside influence is 
that of schools and universities. In the 
im plem entation of any national language 
policy these are certain to be seen as 
im portant means of im proving access to 
languages. It needs to be recognised, 
therefore, that such institutions are not 
culturally neutral and that they instil, in the 
very learning process itself, attitudes, values 
and modes of thought which may well be alien 
to the culture of the languages they profess to 
teach. In such a way educational institutions 
may warp the transmission of cultural values. 
To overcome this built-in prejudice seems 
likely to require a revolution not simply in the 
organisation but in the very conception of 
education itself.
There is little evidence that universities, 
self-identified as they are with the myth of the 
m ainstream  culture, are capable of generating 
any meaningful response to the needs for a 
m ulticultural language policy. In some part 
this paralysis arises from  chronic funding 
deficiencies, which have the effect of reducing 
the range and level of academic and 
managerial expertise and of increasing 
concentration upon the "mainstream". M ore 
crucially, however, it is due to the kind of 
prejudice implicit in the very notion of 
m ainstream  culture. This becomes more 
obvious when funds are restricted or reduced, 
since at such times it becomes essential to
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define "educational" priorities, usually in the 
practice of m anagem ent rather than in the 
processes of academic discussion and 
determ ination. It is as near as possible to  a 
stone cold certainty that public funding of any 
m ulticultural language policy channelled 
through the universities would in the main 
serve only to strengthen the "mainstream", 
with the residue being expended upon 
political window-dressing as a t present.
An illustration of the influence of the myth 
of the m ainstream  in schools, colleges and 
universities is provided by the definition of 
Australian as A ustralian-English in courses 
of A ustralian literature. Such courses do not 
include literature and "oral literature" 
produced in A ustralia in languages other than 
English. Consequently, the campaigns that 
have been waged to get Aust. Lit. "accepted" 
can be seen as a backlash against 
m ulticulturalism  and as a vociferous attem pt 
to strengthen the myth at a time when it is 
under attack.
U niversities, upon  whose graduates 
g o v e r n m e n t  r e l ie s  so  h e a v i ly  f o r  
implem enting and servicing policies, are them 
selves political institutions, which now see 
their prime responsibility as the management 
of public funds ra ther than the prom otion 
and dissem ination of knowledge. The marked 
shift in the balance of power within 
universities from  academics to adm inistrators 
has severely weakened the capacity of 
universities to  participate in the form ation of
educational policy and to respond to the 
educational needs which an agreed national 
policy may identify.
This situation, which is replicated in ajl 
areas of social provision today, is unlikely to 
change until such times as there is a greater 
understanding on the part of governm ent that 
the economic returns from  education, to 
which the Com m onwealth D epartm ent of 
Education paper pays much attention , are 
dependent upon the level of investment. In 
respect of the relationship of a national 
language policy to  governm ent economic 
policy, however, the paper has no com m ent to 
make. Plainly there are specific prejudices 
built into the m anagem ent of the national 
econom y, as there are into the m anagem ent of 
universities, and until these are exposed and 
subjected to m ulticultural directives, there is 
no prospect of presently deprived "cultural 
and sub-cultural groups" in A ustralia being 
given a fair go. There is, o f course, widespread 
s u s p ic io n  th a t  g o v e rn m e n t ta lk  o f  
m ulticulturalism  is nothing more than that. 
W hen finally a consensus has been reached on 
a national language policy, hopefully it will be 
presented to  government with the injunction 
"Put up or shut up".
1. It may be said to have glanced at the matter in 
acknowledging that "access to the literary tradition 
appears to approach the status of a "right", but 
such a formulation underscores the failure to 
wrestle with the issue of rights.
Marx & beyond ....
In March next year, A L R  proposed to 
organise a number of events marking the 
100th anniversary of the death of Karl 
Marx. So far, we are planning a speaking 
tour and symposia, and a new format for 
the journal.
We believe this can be a valuable 
exercise for the Australian left, looking a t
the influence of Karl Marx and assessing 
problems and possibilities for the socialist 
movement.
If you're interested in helping plan such 
a program, contact either the Melbourne 
or Sydney ALR collective.
— A L R  Collective, 
PO Box A247, Sydney South 2000.
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Feminist perspectives
— Jean Bedford interviewed
Jean Bedford was born in Cambridge, England, in 1946 and came to Australia in 
1947. She was brought up in Victoria and, after university, taught English as a 
second language, and worked as a journalist. She was literary editor o f  the National 
Times fro m  1980 until recently when she resigned to take up the S tanford Writing 
Fellowship. A  collection o f  her short stories Country Girl Again was published in 1979 
by Sisters. She lives with the writer Peter Corris and her three daughters in Coledale on 
the South  Coast o f  New South  Wales.
Mike Donaldson talks to her about her book Sister Kate, published recently by  
Penguin.
The day Sister Kate  was launched, the 
National Times reported that it was already a 
best seller in Melbourne. Apart from the fact 
that it is an extremely well crafted book, is 
there any other reason why it's had such 
instant appeal?
I don 't know; I'm really surprised. It must 
be that people are still fascinated by the Kelly 
myth even when it's presented from  the 
woman's point of view. I would have thought 
that with 1981 being the centenary of Ned's 
hanging tha t people would have been sick of 
the Kelly stuff, but it is one of the strongest 
myths in white Australian history.
Ned Kelly and the gang have become 
a r c h e ty p e s  o f  f r e e d o m  a n d  a n t i ­
authoritarianism , a symbol for people who 
feel victimised and want to do something 
about it. Otherwise, the cover, a reproduction 
of Constable Fitzpatrick and Kate Kelly by 
Nolan, is very pretty, and that might have sold 
a few.
You're off to take out a Stanford scholarship. 
Why are you taking out the scholarship, and
what attracts you to the US?
Firstly, I'm attracted  by the possibility of 
being paid to work at something I'd be 
working on anyway. Secondly, I'm keen to get 
a glimpse of American writers a t work. The 
course I'll be attending will be full of young 
American writers, and one of the very few 
things I admire abou t the United States is its 
fiction writing. In term s of narrative fiction, 
the new American writers are probably the 
best in the world. However, I've always 
disliked America and all it stands for, but the 
opportunity  to go and observe it first-hand is 
too good to be missed; it's probably time I 
gave some grounding to my anti-Am erican 
prejudices.
While I'm over there, I'll be working on 
another novel called Grace, which will be 
based on the life of my m other, a woman who 
grew up in the slums of London and then 
settled in rural Australia. She provided me 
with the sort of themes I like — women being 
destroyed by their lives — and it will be an 
opportunity  for me to  work out my 
relationship with her which is something that 
I have not so far been able to do.
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There is a great deal of Australian symbolism  
in Kate; in the first few pages we have gum 
trees, wombats and kookaburras. What 
would you reply if someone said to you that 
your book was "aggressively Australian"?
I'd be pleased. I think A ustralian writers 
should be aggressively Australian. It seems to 
me that we take our symbols and m etaphors 
from  what we see around us, and it's time 
A ustralian ones became part of the language, 
but not too obtrusively; not kangaroos, and 
koalas and w om bats everywhere. W hen I 
became conscious of constructing specifically 
A ustralian symbols, I found it d idn't work, 
and I cut it out as much as possible. But 
generally, it happens pretty naturally. I have 
grown up in the country here and I remember 
things like that, so my similes come pretty 
autom atically, I think.
What about those who say that the "real" 
Australia isn't in the countryside anyway, and 
that since Australia is one o f the most highly 
urbanised countries in the world and has been 
so for a long time, that rural allegory is really 
not meaningful for most Australians?
Rural A ustralia was pretty real in Kate 
Kelly's time, even though there were a lot of 
people in the cities then. W hat was happening 
in rural Australia was historically extremely 
significant, especially round the period of the 
Selection Acts and the consequent form ation 
of an A ustralian poor peasantry. The 
selectors thought that they would have the 
opportunity  to rise, to become more than self- 
sufficient, and possibly even reasonably 
affluent. But they never achieved that. The 
squatters hovered over them, waiting to take 
their land as soon as they could.
The Selection Acts were extremely rigid. If 
the sm allholders couldn't clear a certain 
proportion  of their land, then they stood to 
lose it. The licences had to  be renewed every 
three years and, given that m ost of those who 
had taken up selections were poor families, it 
was very hard fo r them  to get their land 
cleared and the crops sown, to  buy the seed 
and to  actually work the land. If they weren't 
successful then the land was resumed and the
local squatters, the local ruling class 
landowners, took it over as part of their runs. 
There was a lot of provocation on the 
squatters ' part. They used to deliberately run 
their cattle over the selectors' land and then 
accuse them  of cattle duffing. They used to 
deliberately break down fences and then 
accuse them of not developing their land. In 
class terms, what happened in the countryside 
between 1850 and 1900 was really im portant 
for the rest of Australia. Pastoral capital and 
its accum ulation and expansion was the name 
!of the game then. I agree tha t there is this 
whole rural myth in A ustralia which isn't 
based on much reality, but I think tha t this 
period was one where what was happening 
rurally was really im portant for the rest of the 
country.
It is significant in that respect that you 
dedicated Sister Kate  to the memory of Ian 
Turner, a steadfast defender in Australian 
historiography of the legend of the bush-bred, 
independent, rural egalitarian Australia. 
Clearly, Turner has been an influence on your 
work, but what of the women writers of the 
Australian left? D o vou feel yourself to be 
part o f the tradition o f Cusack, Devanny and 
Pritchard? D o you think that there is a viable, 
living tradition there at all?
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I think it's a viable tradition , though I don 't 
have very much literary sympathy with those 
women writers of the 1920s and 1930s. I think 
the Com m unist party interference in their 
work affected it badly and I believe they 
would have written much better work if they 
had not been subject to party  scrutiny and 
censorship. It's very hard to make didactic 
fiction work, anyway, even w ithout that. The 
message has to somehow come through the 
sub-text and is lost if the writer sets out to tell 
people. I can 't think of many writers who have 
made it work; there's de Beauvoir, and 
perhaps Doris Lessing, but I can 't think of 
any Australians who have w ritten didactic 
fiction and still produced good literature. 1 
don 't think I had any of those left women 
writers in mind when I was working. 1 was 
more influenced by people like Jean Rhys 
who wrote about women's lives in the 1920s 
and 1930s in England and France. She didn't 
write from  an overtly left o r feminist or even 
blue-stocking perspective, but nonetheless, 
Rhys presents us with a penetrating portrayal 
of women's lives and the nature of the 
oppression women suffered then. 1 don 't 
think 1 considered myself to  be writing in any 
tradition really; I was just trying to write Kate 
and get it finished with. 1 was simply trying to 
do the best job  1 could.
W hat you suggested about Turner, though, 
is quite true. He was a terrific history teacher. 
He was very anti-great men and battles, and 
pro-social context and understanding what 
the working people of the country lived 
through and created. That was what history 
was all about for Turner, reclaiming the 
texture of the lives of the working class, 
insisting that it never be forgotten or lost. I 
was very heavily influenced by him. He 
introduced me to oral hsitory and showed me 
the im portance in historiography of retrieving 
ordinary people's lives.
Would you describe Sister Kate  as a feminist 
novel?
Well, I hope it is, for I consider myself a 
feminist. But I wasn't trying to put forward 
feminist objectives in the book and, indeed, it
would have been impossible to do this in a 
book like Kate which deals with 19th century 
working class women; injecting feminism 
would have been anachronistic. I suppose, 
though, that some of it is anachronistic in that 
1 probably gave Kate Kelly more liberal views 
than she would have held, given her social 
milieu. But 1 hope it's a feminist book in that it 
retrieves some of the women's part in the 
powerful Kelly legend. I suppose that I meant 
it to be a m oral tale, one with lessons that still 
apply. W omen can be destroyed if they have 
to live through men. I think that's still true.
At the moment there appears to be some 
debate among women cultural workers about 
the representation o f women in their work. 
Some say that women cultural workers 
should concentrate on detailing ands 
revealing the oppression of women, others say 
that what is needed is the production of 
strong, almost, perhaps, heroic characters so 
that women can see the potential that exists 
for them in taking control of their own work 
and activities. How does Sister Kate come to 
terms with this dilemma?
I've made a conscious choice not to go for 
the latter; I'm much more interested in 
dem onstrating w hat's still so terribly wrong 
with women's roles in the world. Until you 
understand the problem  totally, and the 
mechanics of the problem  fully, you're not 
going to  be able to  posit real models for 
change. I don 't know any women who are 
heroic and who have "escaped" in any sense. 
Doris Lessing has turned to science fiction 
and has created a fantasy world in which there 
are heroic women, and it seems to me that 
such heroism would always have to be set in 
the future. Even women like me who have 
come from  the working class and are now 
located in the m iddle class, with the affluence, 
freedoms and choices that brings, and which 
are denied to  w orking class women, still carry 
within us all the seeds of being trapped and 
oppressed. We've ju st turned it into other 
feelings of insecurity and unconfidence. If I 
was to  write about women like me as role 
models, I'd have to be fairly dishonest which, 
as a writer, is som ething I'd really rather not
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be. I'd have to  pretend that all the terrible 
things which I still think are wrong for women 
like me, don 't exist. I couldn't offer us as a role 
model, we're not there yet. I'm  not saying that 
other women couldn 't write books about 
heroic women and make them  honest and 
true. But I'm  not interested in that, and I don 't 
think I'm  capable of doing it.
You have suggested that the relationship of 
left women writers and, in particular, 
communist women writers, to the Communist 
party was one which was bad for the women 
themselves. D o you think it's at all possible 
that not only writers, but women cultural 
workers generally, would be able to work 
inside an organisation like the Communist 
Party, or are organisations like that 
inherently destructive?
I hope it is possible, but I think that as soon 
as you start to  impose any sort of line on art 
(or thought) you 're in danger of producing 
rubbish. It seems to me that what the 
Com m unist Party  of Australia (CPA) did to 
its writers and artists, and what the Chinese 
and Soviet authorities have done more 
recently, is completely anti-m arxist for it 
destroys one part of the dialectic, and 
prevents the possibility of growth. For 
socialism or com m unism  to grow, it has to be 
able to accom m odate change, and art and 
literature particularly are direct avenues for 
expressing both the need and the possible 
directions for change. The im position of a 
line, such as social realism, freezes this crucial 
process.
There are com m unist writers and artists in 
Australia who don 't feel constrained. The 
CPA doesn 't a ttem pt to impose a Tine or 
censorship as it did when it was stalinist. It 
worries me a bit tha t feminism has aspects of 
that sort of "correct line" approach. That is, 
there are some tru ths that women find out 
about themselves, o r think they findout about 
themselves, that are no good because they 
don 't "fit" with the current correct line, so 
they're disapproved of, or peer pressure is 
brought to  bear, to see that they're not 
developed. It is extremely worrying when
political movements attem pt to  curtail their 
m em bers' expression of their own reality. 
Does tha t make sense?
Yes, it certainly does. The problem for me 
arises when I think of industrial workers. 
There are times, I think, when we would have 
no hesitation in saying to an individual 
worker, or section of workers within a union 
or plant, or a union or industry group within 
the labor movement, that they msut curtail 
their actions and refrain from exercising their 
options, in the interests of winning a more 
general victory, o f attaining some more 
common good. You are suggesting that this is 
not the case with cultural workers, that they 
are somehow different.
I th ink we are different. I don 't know  much 
about the visual arts but, apart from  them, 
language is all we have to express everything. 
It is the medium through which workers 
discuss whether or not they should, or should 
not, subsume their individual goals to  some 
com m on good. Language, and expression, 
must rem ain free.
I don 't know .... I detest rightwing writers; 
I'm  not at all dispassionate in tha t sense. 
Serious artists are only trying to  express the 
tru th  of what they see around them , and if you 
interfere with that expression then you're 
suppressing the tru th . An industrial worker 
who says that he genuinely doesn't w ant to act 
in the politically correct m anner, for whatever 
reason, should be able to  do tha t too.
But I suppose I do th ink tha t cultural 
workers are different. The nature of our work 
is different.
Polish Voices ....
Polish men and women speak for 
themselves about Solidarity, democracy 
and the crisis of Polish society.
History in the making
Based on interviews conducted by Denis 
Freney, Poland, August 1981.
Published by A LR , price $2.00 (see inside back 
cover for address).
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A vanguard behind 
the times?
— Bernard Moss on the French 
communists
The 1981 elections in France represented a 
victory not only of the left and the forces of 
labor over the right and capital, but one also 
of the gradualists over the radicals in the labor 
movement. Step by step Francois M itterrand 
had achieved his grand design — uniting and 
revitalising a socialist party out of the ruins of 
the SFIO , engaging a political alliance that 
strengthened the socialists at the expense of 
the communists, defying and defeating his 
allies in electoral com petition and forcing 
their capitulation before a program  bearing 
the m arks of class compromise. For the 
victory of the left, essentially electoralist in 
nature, came as a setback for the PCF, the 
CGT and working class movements, which 
r e m a in e d  d iv id e d  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  
immobilised by the delegation of power. 
Bowing to popular aspirations for change, the 
PC F  conceded defeat, fell into line behind 
M itterrand and undertook a review of past 
errors that had led to the loss of one quarter of 
its electorate.
This exercise of self-criticism, initiated and 
orchestrated by the leadership, culminated in 
the final resolution approved with only two 
abstentions at the 24th congress of the P C F  in 
February. The criticism, evasive with respect 
to current responsibilities, was sweeping and 
radical with respect to the historic past. Blame 
for the M ay defeat was attributed to  late de- 
stalinisation after 1956 and the delay in 
chartering the dem ocratic road to socialism
c u r r e n t ly  e m b o d ie d  in  a strategie  
autogestionnaire — a strategy relying upon 
trade union struggles and worker initiative 
and tending tow ard a society of self­
management.
As a result of this delay, the PCF fell behind 
the times and resurrected a popular front 
strategy that was ill-suited to the new 
aspirations for self-management and to a 
Presidential regime that gave the advantage 
to the more centrist partner in any electoral 
alliance. The form  of unity adopted — a 
com m on program  of government — had 
served to  ham per the independent initiative of 
the class and the party  and to conceal 
differences with the socialists. The Common 
Program  was too abstract, general and 
advanced for popular comprehension. 
Because it failed to articulate a more 
decentralised participatory approach, it left 
the P C F  open to charges that it wanted a 
Soviet-style bureaucratic socialism for 
France. W ith the exception of the form of 
intervention in two notorious incidents — 
M archais' televised approbation  of the 
Afghan invasion direct from  Moscow and the 
bulldozering of an insalubrious immigrant 
hostel at Vitry during the Presidential 
campaign — the leadership scrupulously side­
stepped criticism of its conduct since the 
break with the socialists in 1978. By assigning 
blame to  M aurice Thorez and the historic 
past, the criticism served to  justify current
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policies and leadership and to mask those 
structural problems and errors that had led to 
the May defeat.
The blanket repudiation of the popular 
front strategy — a criticism extended to the 
1930s as well — was an historical sleight of 
hand that was unw orthy of a party conscious 
of its heritage. W hatever the problem s of a 
popular front, it has been a m ainstay of 
revolutionary parties since M arx. M arx in the 
Communist Manifesto, Lenin in 1922, the 
Com intern in 1935 — all advanced jo in t 
program s of governm ent with the forces of 
social dem ocracy as a way of uniting the 
working class, winning over the peasants and 
middle class and isolating the forces of 
capital. Under the Gaullist regime such a 
program  was essential for uniting the 
opposition and reviving prospects for a non­
capitalist alternative.
T h e  p u r s u i t  o f  a p r o g r a m  fo r  
popular unity entailed the condem nation of 
those ultra-left slogans — power is for the 
asking, im agination takes power, all is now 
possible — that flourished in the general 
strike of M ay-June 1968. To suggest tha t the 
PC F would have made greater headway with 
a program  of self-management is to anticipate 
upon events. For even if the com m unists had 
been sufficiently de-stalinised to consider 
such a prospect in 1968, a perspective alien to 
both Second and Third Internationals, a 
program  of self-management would have 
been far less com prehensible to workers 
recovering from  ten years of repression and 
dem oralisation than  were dem ands for 
greater political and social democracy, for 
trade union rights and wage and hours 
improvements.
Launched by the social dem ocratic C FD T 
in solidarity with the student movement, the 
slogan of autogestion m eant everything and 
nothing. Gaullists and social dem ocrats, 
including elements of the C FD T , took it to 
mean worker participation in capitalist 
managem ent, while Trotskyists brandished it 
as a call for revolutionary power. As it was, 
only a small fringe of the working class, 
chiefly professional workers with links to the 
university, took it up as a concrete dem and
for corporate au tonom y.1 So hazy was its 
m eaning that most workers actually identified 
it with the program  of the PCF! As the P C F  
said at the time, dem ocratic political change 
by means of a com m on program  of the left 
was a precondition for any kind of 
autogestion involving working class control.
Post-1968 strategy
Despite the mistakes it made in dealing 
with the student movement, the P C F  was 
quick to  recover and to  incorporate lessons of 
M ay-June into its grand strategy. The 
M anifesto of Cham pigny issued in D ecem ber 
of tha t year was a new synthesis tha t m arked 
a decisive break with the Soviet bureaucratic 
m odel.2 It outlined the perspective of a
Mitterrand (top) and Marchais
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peaceful transition to  socialism without civil 
war, of a socialism respecting political 
pluralism  and liberty, and of a party  acting as 
the vanguard of the working class rather than 
an instrum ent of state control. The dynamic 
element in the strategy was working class 
struggle from below leading to com m on 
program s with social democracy that would 
be supported by popular forces at each stage 
of the way. To succeed with the strategy the 
PC F  had to avoid the shoals of reformism and 
extremism. The reform ist danger lay in a 
com m on program  that was not supported and 
articulated by independent initiatives and 
working class struggle, one that could be 
recuperated by reformist elements in the 
alliance. The extrem ist danger was a 
syndicalist strategy that concentrated on 
trade union and workplace activity to  the 
neglect of left unity and a com m on program . 
In the end, the PC F succeeded in com m itting 
both errors — the opportunist one during the 
period of the C om m on Program  and the 
ultra-left one since 1978.
The Com m on Program  signed in 1972, 
largely on the basis of the com m unists' own 
program , was the kind of transitional 
program  — similar in nature to that of the 
Paris Commune or Lenin's April Theses — 
that had always eluded the Second and Third 
Internationals. It sought to  free the state and 
economy from capitalist dom ination, to 
improve working and living conditions for the 
vast m ajority and to dem ocratise the 
institutions of daily life. Reflecting the 
strength of revolutionary forces in France, it 
was a more radical version of what had 
become known in English-speaking countries 
as the alternative economic strategy.3 Its main 
features were: 1) the nationalisation of all
credit institutions and key industrial groups 
to  give the public sector the capacity to 
control the private sector; 2) new powers for 
workers and unions to control production in 
the private sector and to  co-manage the public 
sector; 3) rises in wages and social 
expenditures linked to  increased productivity 
and output; 4) channelling production away 
from  specialised export, the global capitalist 
division of labor, tow ard meeting local
consum er and social needs and increased 
trade with third-w orld and socialist countries. 
Designed as a program  of government for five 
years (the life of parliam ent), it left room  for 
worker participation and initiative, notably 
with respect to dem ands for further 
nationalisation. It was a coherent program  of 
change, balancing supply and dem and factors 
under a new economic logic and offering 
credible prospects for peaceful transition 
within the basic institutions of the Fifth 
Republic.
Had the PC F  integrated this program  into 
its long-term strategy, had it avoided 
opportunist and ultra-left errors, it would 
have surely found it self further down the road 
to socialism today. It was handicapped in 
finding the proper equilibrium  by the Stalinist 
legacy. The Com intern under Stalin had 
forged monolithic parties that linked a 
dogmatic version of marxism with a highly 
c e n tra l is e d  c o m m a n d  s t r u c tu r e  an d  
agitational style of propaganda and work. 
For communists form ed in this mould de- 
stalinisation was an extremely difficult and 
painful process. R ather than return to the 
theoretical source and elaborate anew a 
strategy to suit particular national conditions, 
communists tended to  frame every issue in 
terns of the old versus the new, ancients and 
-m o d e rn s ,  S t a l i n i s t s  v e r s u s  E u r o -  
Communists. The fact that a policy was 
Stalinist, that it had been practised by 
communists between 1928 and 1956, was of 
course no more proof of error than of 
worthiness. No party  went through de- 
stalinisation w ithout some damage to its 
internal cohesion and fidelity to marxism.
In the case of the PCF, committed to a 
strict sense of unity, the debate took place not 
so much between sharply delineated factions 
as between old and new sensibilities, usually 
identified with the party  apparatus and 
intellectuals respectively, but often raging 
within each individual breast. Within the 
political bureau debates, kept a closely 
guarded secret, may have pitted old guard 
personalities like G aston Plissonnier and 
Claude Poperen along with the more complex 
Roland Leroy against the more liberal Paul
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Laurent, Pierre Juquin  and Jean Kanapa on 
some but not all issues. Under the pressure of 
events and the socialist challenge the 
decisions taken by Georges M archais, the 
Secretary-General, were m arked by haste and 
im provisation. The most egregious example, 
from a theoretical point of view, was 
M a rc h a is ' su d d en  a n n o u n c e m e n t on 
television in 1976 that the PC F  was 
abandoning the doctrine of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. As dissident Althusserians 
pointed out, the PC F could repudiate the 
Stalinist dogm a, which associated proletarian 
rule with terror and the one-party state, but it 
could not banish a basic m arxist concept that 
was sy n o n y m o u s w ith  w o rk in g  class 
democracy.
Rank-and-file discussion
Nearly all the critical decisions of the '70s
— to sign the Com m on Program , to abandon 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, to accept 
the nuclear strike force, to break with the 
s o c ia l is ts  a n d  a d o p t  th e  strategie  
autogestionnaire — were taken without 
consultation of the rank and file and with only 
ce rem o n ia l d iscu ss io n  in the  ce n tra l 
committee. Kept in the dark about the 
debates, m otivations and reasoning of the 
political bureau, this committee could only 
rubber stam p decisions.4 With only laconic 
pronouncem ents to guide them, even 
members am enable to the leadership had a 
hard time following the party line. Due to the 
lack of clarity and political education, few 
members were capable of justifying the basic 
options of the C om m on Program  when they 
came under fire in 1977. By then, the 
le a d e rsh ip  w as faced  w ith  w iden ing  
divergences between those members, chiefly 
intellectuals, who thought the party had not 
gone far enough in the direction of Euro­
com m unism , and officials of the apparatus, 
who felt it had gone too far and was in danger 
of losing its strength and identity to the 
socialists. The practice of a highly uniform  
centralism that filtered out divergent opinions 
in the cells above the section level and that 
concealed debates am ong party leaders was 
not conducive to real political unity. A
leadership cut off from  party  debate — 
including its own — was not likely to  measure 
its words, weigh decisions, find adequate 
responses to  criticism and achieve proper 
synthesis.
The m ajor fault of analysis in the '70s 
concerned the nature of the new Socialist 
Party. The PCF treated the PS in a schematic 
way as a social dem ocratic party  that was 
naturally inclined to com prom ise with 
capitalism  and imperialism, but which could 
be pushed along the path to socialism by mass 
action. It could not conceive that an 
electoralist party composed of teachers, 
politicians and technocrats could be any more 
sincere about achieving socialism than  a blue- 
collar social dem ocratic party , it refused to 
e x p lo it , o r reco g n ise , th e  m an ifo ld  
contradictions in the PS between socialist 
ideals and reformist practices, between 
n a t i o n a l  g o a ls  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
com m itm ents, and am ong the diverse 
tendencies and personalities vying for 
M itterrand's attention. When the alliance 
broke down, the crude attacks on the PS as a 
social dem ocratic party returning to capitalist 
austerity, the NATO alliance, and a centrist 
coalition lacked credibility because they did 
not wholly correspond with reality. The fault 
of analysis was com pounded by a style of 
agitational propaganda. H am m ering slogans 
rather than seeking to persuade by suggestion 
and reasoning may be effective in peasant 
countries or am ong com m itted workers, but 
in this case drove intellectuals and sceptics 
away from  the party in droves.
A nother handicap — at least it turned out 
to be — was the Soviet connection. A nti­
com m unists succeeded in turning the strident 
anti-Sovietism  of the '70s — the U SSR as 
Gulag — against the party and its program . 
The actual degree of association with Soviet 
communism was far more limited than  people 
were led to believe. The PC F  had broken with 
the one-party state model of socialism 
beginning in 1963. As it chartered a 
dem ocratic path, it began to criticise 
measures of political repression in socialist 
countries and to call for dem ocratisation 
within the limits of existing institutions. By
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1978 criticism of bureaucratic distortions in 
the Soviet Union had reached Trotskyist 
proportions.5 The only respect in which 
fidelity to Moscow was unyielding was in the 
international arena. The PC F was determined 
not to support any position that might tend to 
weaken the Soviet bloc as a counter-weight to 
US and Western imperialism. Support for 
Soviet policy internationally made it even 
more imperative to distinguish PC F strategy 
from the Soviet model. Despite its strategie 
autogestionnaire the PCF paid a heavy price 
for its unqualified support for the Afghan 
invasion and more conditional approval of 
the martial law regime in Poland. Of the 
million or so voters who deserted the P C F  in 
1981, m ost expressed dissatisfaction with the 
party 's position in these m atters.6 But these 
positions proved to be a serious handicap 
on ly  b ecau se  o f  m o re  fu n d a m e n ta l 
weaknesses in party  policy and practice.
The Stalinist legacy made it difficult to deal 
with the challenges that came from  the New 
Left and SP. If the frontist strategy in 1968 
was basically sound, it was carried out with a 
crudeness and brutality that alienated an 
entire student generation who were accused of 
being unwitting tools of the bourgeoisie, if not 
agents provocateurs.7 Student radicals like 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit were more intent on 
crushing the ''Stalinist scum" than on 
overturning De Gaulle — their design was to 
confront De Gaulle over the corpse of the 
PC F  — but they did not represent the whole 
of the student movement whose aims 
deserved better than the ridicule and invective 
of the PC F . A less defensive party  would have 
known how to take up the dem ands of the 
"new" social categories —  youth, women, 
immigrants, professionals and the unskilled, 
radicalised by M ay-June. Instead, the PC F 
allowed itself to be outm anoeuvred by the 
C FD T  which could criticise their excesses 
while sympathising with their aspirations. As 
a result of the alienation of these categories, 
the communist-led CGT lost its unquestioned 
leadership over the trade union movement.
After 1972 the P C F  mishandled the 
problem s arising from left unity. The results
of the alliance were more positive than the 
PCF is now willing to admit. During the 
period 1972-1978 the PC F  doubled its 
membership — to 700,000 — increased its 
total num ber of votes (while suffering an 
erosion of less than one percent) and hold 
over local governments, m aintained a high 
level of strike activity of a political character 
during a period of industrial decline, won 
wide acceptance for its dem and for a role in 
government and popularised the themes that 
underlay M itterrand 's presidential platform
— n a tio n a lis a t io n , re in d u s tr ia lis a tio n , 
greater equality of income and wealth, and an 
increase in popular consum ption.8
The problem  with the Com m on Program  
was not the form  of unity — nothing 
prevented the P C F  from  criticising the PS or 
taking independent initiatives — but the 
opportunistic way in which the program  was 
prom oted and justified. Until 1977 the party 
treated it with alm ost the same inattention as 
M itterrand, as an electoral platform  and 
symbol of unity ra ther than a series of 
measures to change society. In the 1973 
elections, the PC F  presented itself as the 
guaran tor of the program , but it neglected to 
explain or justify the measures it contained. 
D oubts about socialist sincerity, expressed in 
a secret report to the central committee, were 
hushed up. In the Presidential election of 
1974, the PC F  rallied unconditionally to 
M itterrand who not only presented a much 
attenuated platform , but recruited rightwing 
critics of the C om m on Program  like Michel 
Rochard to his cam paign staff.
Following M itterrand 's narrow  defeat, the 
PC F tried to em ulate the socialists' 
electoralism by calling for a union of the 
entire French people against m onopoly 
capital and by soft-pedalling the socialist 
character of the program . The sudden 
reversal — the outburst of attacks on the PS
— that occurred after losses in six by- 
elections in Septem ber seemed motivated by 
narrow partisan concerns. R ather than make 
a detailed critique of the accom m odationist 
trends in the PS — M itterrand 's swing away 
from the leftwing CERES and alliance with 
the R icardians, his penchant for "brilliant"
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technocrats like Jacques Delors and Jacques 
Attali — the party simply accused the PS of 
abandoning the program  and accepting 
capitalist austerity. Instead of pinning 
M itterrand dow n on his interpretation of the 
program , it relented on its criticism once he 
protested his loyalty and agreed to a series of 
mass meetings to denounce capitalist 
austerity. W ithout the m aterial evidence of 
socialist accom m odation, P C F  polemics 
merely bewildered and angered newcomers to 
the left who had never personally experienced 
social dem ocratic betrayal.
By the time the P C F  did undertake its full- 
scale cam paign against socialist betrayal, 
which was real,9 it had become so enmeshed in 
the myth of left unity tha t it could only 
criticise its partner at its peril. The party 
waited too long, until after it had racked up 
municipal gains on jo in t lists with the 
socialists, before proposing the necessary 
updating of the program . Indications are that 
it was taken by surprise by M itterrand 's 
obduracy, his unwillingness to discuss new 
terms, his refusal to  com prom ise, his 
insistence on keeping a tree hand. By standing 
up to the PC F , M itterrand indeed hoped to 
increase his popularity and to  force the party 
into accepting an auxiliary role. By 
background and training, P C F  leaders were 
prepared to expect ideological deviation, but 
the Gaullist hau teur and rule of M itterrand 
was som ething they did not know how to 
handle. Several years of complaisance 
punctuated by occasional fits of ill tem per 
had left the P C F  in a weak position to counter 
M itterrand's design.
In retrospect, the PC F  cam paign for the 
program  against the socialists, which was 
decried by some liberal elements in the party 
at the time, appears fully justified, but it was 
conducted with the subtlety of a sledge­
hammer. Instead of exploiting the manifold 
contradictions in socialist positions — made 
apparent in the course of negotiations — the 
party simply denounced the PS as a social 
dem ocratic party  that had turned to  the right 
under pressure from  the bourgeoisie and 
G erm an Social Democracy, accepting the 
need for w orking class austerity and
preparing the way for a reversal of alliances 
with the centre-right. The party  did not 
explore the possibility of a "third way" 
whereby the PS would implement an 
attenuated version of the C om m on Program  
with the PC F  in harness in a Left alliance. 
W hile the P C F  was virtually forced in M ay 
1981 to  accept the possibility of a "third way" 
under the more favorable conditions of a 
M itterrand presidency, it could not have 
afforded to  surrender to  a PS oriented further 
to the right under Giscard, w ithout a fight. If, 
on balance, the propositions of the PS in 1978 
were no more accom m odating to  capital than 
those of 198110, M itterrand was then allied 
with Rocardian advocates of austerity who 
would have weighed heavily in a left
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government. But for its com bination of 
opportunist and sectarian errors, the PC F 
nevertheless could have won the fight.
Once the decision to  break was taken — 
neither side was interested in compromise 
after Septem ber — the P C F  veered to  the left 
when it announced tha t it would no longer 
autom atically w ithdraw for a better placed 
socialist on the second round and that it 
would run its own Presidential candidate in 
1981. Little notice was taken of a decision 
approved w ithout discussion tha t not only 
m arked a reversal of PC F  policy but also of a 
d e e p ly -ro o te d  tra d i t io n  o f  re p u b lic a n  
discipline against the right. The inference 
draw n was that the P C F  considered the 
socialists to  be no better than  the right, a 
startling suggestion that was to  have 
disastrous consequences in 1981.
R ather than open discussion on the reasons 
for the defeat of the Program  in the M arch 
elections — a strong com m unist vote might 
have saved it — the party  clamped down on 
debate and castigated those dissident 
intellectuals who were criticising from  behind 
the security of their professorial chairs. The 
leadership drew into its bunker, the industrial 
working class, and quietly abandoned the 
struggle for unity and the Com m on Program . 
In the absence of any project for left unity, 
voters were left with no hope for political 
change. To satisfy the need for change the
PC F  substituted its so-called strategic 
autogestionnaire. According to this strategy, 
workers would achieve through trade union 
struggles those reforms that would anticipate 
upon socialism .11 This was precisely the kind 
of syndicalist strategy that the P C F  had 
denounced in the CFD T! Its reform ist limits 
had just been tested in the trade union 
cam paign to save the French steel industry. 
So long as the state remained under capitalist 
dom ination, a situation which the P C F  had 
no strategy for changing, how could trade 
union struggles result in anything but the mild 
reformism of the C FD T  and FO?
The blunders com m itted in the 1981 
Presidential campaign flowed directly from 
the new strategy; indeed, they were made 
deliberately to  accustom  people to it. 12 The
P C F  had abandoned left unity and the hopes 
of electoral victory to  the socialists in order to 
concentrate on workplace struggles. It 
assumed that its vanguard role in the factories 
would eventually be rewarded at the polls, 
forgetting that voters respond to  quite 
different appeals and m otivations from  
strikers. Since the experience of the Com m on 
Program  had presum ably shown that workers 
could not understand abstract and general 
program s, they were to be presented with 131 
separate objectives of struggle, all draw n from 
the Program ! In a cam paign that put struggle 
before persuasion, M archais was given free 
rein to  act out the role of the aggrieved 
working class primitive who delighted in 
scandalising self-satisfied bourgeois and 
confounding simpering TV journalists. Short 
on media coverage, for reasons for which it 
was partly responsible, the P C F  relied upon 
enthusiastic solidarity meetings with the blue- 
c o l la r  f a i th f u l  a n d  c o m m a n d o - lik e  
propaganda of the deed — the bulldozing at 
Vitry, the shutdow n of a live television 
discussion on youth and unem ploym ent 
which had deliberately excluded the CGT, the 
vigilante denunciation, w ithout adequate 
proof, of drug traffickers at M ontigny.
The broadsides fired at the PS fell even 
wider of the m ark than in 1978, for 
M itterrand had taken a few turns to the left in
1979 when he m arginalised Rocard. Taking 
no notice of the shift, the P C F  now flatly 
asserted that M itterrand was no better than 
Giscard; nay,-his com m itm ent to the A tlantic 
alliance made him even worse. M itterrand's 
platform , draw n from  basic options of the 
Com m on Program , was denounced as a 
smokescreen for capitalist austerity. From  the 
faulty analysis came a tactical error that 
proved fatal in M ay — the refusal to 
guarantee support for M itterrand on the 
second round. If the M archais candidacy had 
been presented as a way of leaning on 
M itterrand and pushing him to the left, it 
would have attracted  a much larger following 
that would have given the P C F  greater 
leverage with the new regime. By refusing to 
acknowlede that a M itterrand presidency 
could be an instrum ent of change, the PC F  
confirmed suspicions that it might by calling
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for abstention on the second round, play the 
spoiler role and help re-elect Giscard (some 
old guard leaders may indeed have favored 
this tactic in hopes of splitting up the PS). To 
vote for M archais under these conditions was 
to  risk the re-election of Giscard. One quarter 
of the P C F  electorate deserted because they 
preferred even a reform ist socialist to 
accelerating unem ploym ent and industrial 
decline.
The grey of P C F  strategy was overtaken by 
the green of popular will. The collapse of the 
P C F  vote and swing tow ard M itterrand, 
wholly unexpected, compelled the realisation 
that he was not only better than  Giscard, but 
that with his own hesitating gait and 
European rhythm , he might even open the 
way to  socialism. In his first year of office, 
M itterrand carried out most o f his pledges, 
ta k in g  m e a s u re s  to  in c re a s e  so c ia l 
expenditure, the m inimum wage and public 
service em ploym ent, to  open space for union 
and worker initiative, to decentralise the state 
and guarantee civil liberties, and to 
nationalise all credit institutions and seven 
key industrial concerns. Falling into line 
w ithout in the least revising its strategie 
autogestionnaire which was quite compatible 
with reformism, the P C F  agreed to  keep its 
own action and criticism within the bounds 
set by the voters in May. W ithout apologising 
for recent aggressions against the PS, the 
P C F  subscribed to  a new rule of conduct "not 
so much to denounce as to explain, not to 
much criticise as propose, and not only 
propose, but construct, achieve, realise, 
concretise".13 It used its participation in 
governm ent to  urge it forw ard, its legislative 
function in parliam ent to weigh the positive, 
negative and insufficient, and its trade union 
position to accom plish in the workplace what 
the governm ent and legislature had failed to 
do by law. As a party of governm ent and 
struggle, the P C F  enjoyed the benefits of 
being in both  worlds, gaining recognition for 
the dedicated work of its ministers and for the 
com bativity of its m ilitants in the factories. In 
sh o rt, the  P C F  w as co m p e lled  by 
circumstances to  adopt a position of critical
support, of unity and struggle, of struggle 
within unity, for its socialist partners.
If the P C F  currently enjoys such an 
enviable position as a party  of governm ent 
andstruggle, why undertake criticism of past 
and recent errors? The P C F  has been 
seriously weakened by the defeat of M ay 10. 
Satisfied with its role of tribune and vanguard 
of the w orking class, it has surrendered to  its 
stronger inter-classist partner the job  of 
determ ining national policy and goals. 
W hatever happens to the governing coalition, 
the P C F  is not likely to  recuperate its electoral 
losses in the next four years. N or with the 
most com bative trade unionists in the world, 
is the CGT likely to regain leadership over all 
elements of the working class, particularly 
white collar workers, so long as the P C F  lies 
under a political cloud. In late 1981, the CGT 
was running with the wind, gaining in factory 
elections for the first time since 1969, until 
m artial law was declared — with the 
acquiescence of the P C F  and C G T — in 
Poland.
M itterrand has forced the P C F  to play an 
auxiliary role which will not be easily 
overcome. The P C F  has been impressed into 
service of a regime whose destiny is by no 
means assured. The contradictions of French 
socialism — between socialist ideals and an 
a c c o m m o d a t io n is t  p r a c t ic e ,  b e tw e e n  
advocates and opponents of austerity, 
between socialist domestic policies and 
E u ro p e a n  C o m m u n ity  tra d e  p o lic ie s , 
between support for the Third W orld and a 
com m itm ent to  US militarism — have yet to  
be resolved. How to increase wages, social 
expenditures and em ploym ent in an  econom y 
open to  com petition from  W estern partners in
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the midst of the greatest depression in half a 
century?
The structural reforms of the first year 
accom panied by m inor wage and hours gains 
may have arrested economic decline, but they 
have not produced sustained growth or 
reduced unemployment. In  the absence of 
firm  government directives the newly 
nationalised firms have continued to 
implement prior corporate plans for lay-offs, 
shutdowns and foreign investment. The first 
anniversary of the M itterrand election was 
m arked by a record balance of trade deficit 
and the announcem ent of a social pause, 
in c lu d in g  ta x  re lie f  fo r  b u sin ess , a 
m oratorium  on new social expenditures and 
reforms, and a wage-price freeze that will 
reduce average real income over the next two 
years. Restraints on social expenditures and 
new taxes on working people were features of 
the recent 1983 budget.
By aim ing to  please all classes the French 
government may end up satisfying none. 
Appeasement of big business has neither 
spurred industrial investment nor disarmed 
the hostility of the right while it has 
disappointed workers who have yet to  see any 
general im provem ent in working and living 
conditions, the absence o f working class 
enthusiasm  was apparent in the local cantonal 
elections in M arch which were won by an 
aroused right wing. Preparations for local 
municipal elections in march 1983 do not 
augur well for the Left.
The P C F  knows that the way to industrial 
recovery under M itterrand will be crooked 
and narrow. It has probably averted a more 
serious drift to the right and austerity. The 
tragedy of past and recent errors is that it may 
have lost the capacity to  stay the course.
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Fifty years 
of the ACTU
— Roger Coates
By some standards the A ustralian trade 
union m ovem ent has been an outstanding 
success. A lthough it has sometimes been 
sharply divided ideologically, it has achieved 
a wide coverage of the workforce and an 
alm ost complete structural unity. In the last 
decade m ajor new affiliations of white-collar 
and governm ent employees have highlighted 
this growing organisational strength. In the 
same period financing has dram atically 
im p ro v e d , a n d  p ro fe s s io n a l is m  an d  
sophistication have grown. The ACTU now is 
not so disadvantaged in the fairly unequal 
battle with governm ent and employers as it 
once was. And partly as a cause, partly as a 
consequence, m any of the ACTU's affiliates 
have grown stronger and more effective.
Bald figures underline this story of recent
rapid developm ent and greater cohesion. 
F rom  1972 to  1975 the proportion  of trade 
unionists in the employed w orkforce rose 
from  53 percent to a relatively high 58 percent
— a faster rate o f grow th than  during 
W orld W ar II. Between 1971 and 1979 (before 
the CAGEO affiliation) the m em bership of 
ACTU-affiliated unions grew by over half a 
million, and in 1979 (perhaps the m ost 
significant figure) over 72 percent of all trade 
unionists were in ACTU-affiliated unions (62 
percent in 1971).
Quantitatively and organisationally, this is 
a success story. However, as Jim  Hagan 
notices, apart from  the printing and metal
The History of the A.C.T.U. by Jim Hagan, 
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1981, xii + 476pp.
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workers' am algam ations in the 1960s and 
1970s (not really industrial unionism  anyway 
and to which the ACTU contributed little) the 
ACTU has fallen far short of the grand 
objectives of its founders: the socialisation of 
industry and the transform ation of the trade 
union movement from  craft to industrial 
unionism.
The lack of a solid history of the Australian 
labor movement constitutes a great gap in the 
intellectual wherewithal of the political left in 
A ustralia. (There are a num ber of excellent 
partial studies.) And until somebody comes 
up with something more comprehensive and 
complete, Hagan's The History o f the ACTU  
may, by default, serve the purpose. Not that 
Hagan has set his sights low. His book is an 
am bitious undertaking and in many respects a 
m ajor achievement, even if it doesn't always 
live up to its basic conception and good 
beginning.
Hagan tries to ensure that the reader sees 
the ACTU in the round. Although, as he 
readily acknowledges in his preface, the book 
fails to deal adequately with the "other" 
history, the one from below in the factories, 
mines, offices, banks and schools, with the 
actual class struggle and the "ebb and flow" of 
working-class consciousness, it is nevertheless 
not a narrow  institutional history. In fact, it is 
alm ost five distinct books (which may be a 
source of weakness with some unw arranted 
repetition and a little loss of direction): the 
ACTU and the unions; the ACTU and the 
government; the ACTU and the employers; 
the ACTU and the economy; and the ACTU 
and the arbitration system. And running 
through it, trying to bind it all together, not 
always with uniform success, is a m ajor 
theme: the ACTU as an historic compromise 
b etw een  la b o u rism  an d  re v o lu tio n a ry  
industrialism .
The revolutionary syndicalism of the IW W 
(Industrial W orkers of the W orld), the One 
Big U n ion ism  o f the  re v o lu tio n a ry  
industrialists and the revolutionary unionism 
of the communists, all had a measure of 
com m on ground which can perhaps best be 
referred to  as revolutionary industrialism  — a 
feeling (as much as a doctrine) that social
re v o lu tio n  d ep en d s  a lm o s t so lely  on 
industrial working class organisation and 
power.
Australian labourism
In Hagan's definition of Australian 
labourism  there are five features: a strong 
trade union movement; a parliam entary 
Labor Party  based on the trade unions; a 
protective tariff policy to develop Australian 
industry and provide jobs at fair wages; a 
W hite A ustralia policy based on ideas of 
ethnic superiority and "purity"; and a system 
of com pulsory industrial arb itration to 
determine fair wages and working conditions.
Hagan stays with this definition of 
la b o u r is m  th r o u g h o u t ,  w ith o u t re a l 
acknowledgment of other im portant points 
and the significance of the particular mix that 
applies at any specific moment. This rigidity 
leads to  over-simplification of the dichotom y 
between labourists and revolutionaries and 
reduces the explanation to too black-and- 
white a picture.
Hagan manages, quite contrary to the facts, 
to leave out of his definition a socialist strand 
whereas socialism has always been an element 
of labourism  — albeit of fluctuating and 
uncertain proportions. And, of course, in 
1921, six years before the form ation of the 
ACTU, at the behest of the All-Australian 
Trade Union Congress of that year, this 
strand became quite explicit.
Social catholicism and Irish ethnicity is 
another, almost as im portant, omitted strand. 
T h u s , B .A . S a n ta m a r ia 's  n o to r io u s  
"M ovement" appears in Hagan, alm ost deus 
ex machina whereas it sprang from  a 
conservative attem pt to co-opt this particular 
strand for rightwing purposes. Some might 
argue that male sexism is an equally 
im portant omission.
M oreover, Hagan doesn 't allow for the 
significant weakening of white Australian 
chauvinism over the last fifteen years. Nor 
does he give sufficient weight to the vigorous 
attack on maleism in approxim ately the same 
period although he doesn 't ignore completely 
the ACTU's developm ent of a women's
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policy. There is perhaps an  even more serious 
failure: an alm ost complete neglect of the 
effects of non-English speaking m igration, 
especially since W orld W ar II, the consequent 
segmentation of the workforce, different 
traditions tow ards work and workers' 
organisations and the relative lack of concern 
about ethnicity in the trade unions and the 
ACTU.
The origins of the ACTU
H agan's detailed and coherent account of 
the immediate circumstances leading to the 
form ation of the ACTU shows quite clearly 
that, as with so much else subsequently, the 
initiative lay with the revolutionaries. Briefly, 
there were three main impulses at work 
leading to the establishm ent of a national 
trade union centre: first, the steady growth of 
a national consciousness and the need for 
stronger organisation across state borders; 
secondly, a deep concern about the problem 
of unco-ordinated direct action and the 
possible th reat that it constituted to the 
viability of trade union organisation; and, 
thirdly, the anti-labourist, anti-political belief 
of a growing num ber of class-conscious 
workers that only a strong, independent 
industrial organisation could bring about a 
successful revolution.
Hagan shows tha t the agreement to form 
the ACTU was a principled compromise 
between revolutionary industrialism  and 
labourism. It was, in effect, an  aspect of what 
had become know n as the workers' united 
front. The ACTU was to be the organised 
trade union em bodim ent of the united front 
of different sections of the working class. The 
principal architects of the strategy and 
therefore founders of the ACTU were E.J. 
Holloway, the secretary of the M elbourne 
Trades Hall Council, C. Crofts, secretary of 
the Federated Gas Employees' Union, ands a 
key figure in the Com m onwealth Council of 
Federal Unions (CCFU), and J.S. (Jock) 
Garden, secretary of the NSW  Labor 
Council. But it should be said, and Hagan's 
account brings this out clearly, that the 
ultim ate organiser, strategist and key-note 
speaker a t the founding congress was that
m an-for-all-seasons, Jock Garden.
This is not the place to try to come to grips 
with the complexities, m otivations and 
paradoxes of Garden's politics and character. 
His enemies and detractors from  both right 
and left have so muddied the waters tha t there 
is no easy way to establish the essential truth 
about him. But his com m on image as a 
demagogue or mere opportunist and crook 
will not stand up to careful research and 
analysis. He was as capable of serious error as 
the next person, and he certainly wasn't an 
encyclopaedic marxist. Yet he grasped and at 
times brilliantly applied to Australian 
conditions some of the m ajor ideas and main 
theoretical discoveries of international 
communism. Perhaps the greatest paradox  
about him was that in the middle of him 
moving to organise the ACTU he was 
expelled from  the Com m unist Party  for 
fa ilin g  to  p u b lic ly  ack n o w led g e  his 
membership of an organisation (the CPA) of 
which he had been one of the principal and 
most public founders.
J.S. Garden's role
Garden realised that after the failure of the 
One Big Union (OBU), of which of course he 
had been one of the key figures too, the only 
practical approach to launching a continuing 
national trade union organisation was to base 
it on the central trade union councils which 
had a long history of increasing stability, 
strength and acceptance. After the effective 
end, in 1923, of attem pts to launch the OBU 
and the form ation of the largely Victorian- 
based Commonwealth Council of Federal 
Unions, Garden worked rem arkably skilfully 
to head off the CCFU influence and bring 
about an historic compromise — an 
A ustralian trade union council.
G arden had the general backing of the 
CPA 's mass influence and policy initiatives 
through the NSW  Labor Council's various 
Trades Groups, but it seems likely that to 
some extent friction developed between 
G arden and the party leadership over the 
ACTU. In any case the detailed strategy and 
organisational arrangem ents could have only
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been carried through by som ebody of 
G arden's political perspective acting through 
his public, official position.
On this point Hagan says:
Why was it that the constitution 01 the 
ACTU won endorsement so easily .... ? Part 
of the answer seems to lie in what Garden 
had recognised: that building the new 
organisation on the basis of the Trades and 
Labour Councils would allay the wors't fears 
of the craft unions .... But another important 
part of it lies in the combination of that 
structure with .... government by a biennial 
congress, a body which the larger industrial 
unions were better able to influence. Thus 
the structure was a compromise .... whether 
they believed in bringing the revolution out 
of big unions, whether they believed in 
working for socialism by established 
labourist methods, or whether they merely 
believed in concentrating on winning a 
maximum advantage from an existing 
capitalist system, (p.83)
The communists and the ACTU
The com m unists backed the ACTU from  
the beginning. Except for the period in the 
early 1930s when the ACTU leaders along 
with o ther union and A LP leaders, including 
many of the left, were stigmatised as social 
fascists, and a leading C PA  trade union figure 
moved that the NSW  L abor Council 
disaffiliate from the ACTU, this backing has 
continued. A lthough the com m unists differed 
theoretically from  their predecessors, say, in 
the IW W , fundam entally the com m unist 
s tra tegy  fo r revo lu tion , especially  in 
A ustralia, depended on establishing strong 
w orkers' industrial organisations.
Com m unists have differed over how much 
weight should be given to direct influence 
over the established union structures, in 
particular the significance of holding high 
union office, but there is no doub t that where 
and when com m unist workers held senior 
official positions they were able to influence 
ACTU policy debates and decisions. When 
backed by an active rank and file and helped 
by propitious circumstances, they assisted 
la r g e  g r o u p s  o f  w o r k e r s  ( m in e r s ,
metalworkers, seamen, etc.) and the class as a 
whole, to improve their lot very materially by 
shortening the weekly hours of work, 
increasing pay rates and improving working 
conditions, etc.
W here th e  co m m u n is ts  a d e q u a te ly  
recognised the role of the ACTU, such as in 
the 1930s after 1935, they were successful. At 
any particular time the ACTU embodied the 
actual level of trade union unity, and ACTU 
sym pathy and support constituted a crucial 
element in any contem plated strategy or 
campaign. H agan beautifully illustrates this 
point with the approach of the com m unists in 
the M iners ' Federation before and after 
World W ar II.
The two situations were not equal in all 
o ther respects, but the fact that the post-war 
situation was politically more difficult — a 
Labor governm ent, a more clearly stalinist, 
and also anti-com m upist, international and 
domestic atm osphere, etc — made it even 
m ore imperative that an industrial strategy 
based on a broad trade union unity followed. 
However, whereas in the period 1937-40 the 
M iners' Federation took great pains to get
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the ACTU onside with consequent solid 
gains, in 1949 the M iners' Federation went i t ‘ 
alone except for the support of the other 
leading m ilitant unions. Thus the 1949 Coal 
Strike became a head-on contest between 
revolutionary industrialism  and labourism. 
The CPA  political leadership implicitly 
estimated there would be a weakening of 
reform ist labourism , both industrially and 
politically, and in some ill-defined way such 
industrial struggles would lead to a socialist 
revolution.
In the m ore than  thirty years since the 
failure of the 1949 Coal Strike some of the 
m isconceptions ab o u t a revo lu tionary  
strategy have been straightened out, but there 
has been a never-ending debate about 
industrial policy and tactics. A vigorous 
industrialism  boiled up again in 1969 over the 
im prisonm ent of the leading militant official 
Clarrie O 'Shea. It continued to make 
substantial headway until 1974.
The trade union movement has been 
changing. In the 1960s and '70s we witnessed 
considerable fragm entation of the com m unist 
movement. The rise of new left forces — often 
left labourist and associated with new and 
growing technical and sub-professional 
sections of the workforce — has further 
complicated the picture. Such diversity tends 
to confound simple scenarios about a strategy 
for radical and fundam ental social change. 
Even tactical left unity is something that 
sometimes defies the wit of today's 
revolutionary industrialists.
Revolutionary industrialism
The heyday of revolutionary industrialism  
in Australia occurred between 1920 and 1950. 
One of its successes was the compromise that 
brought the ACTU into existence. It made an 
im portant contribution to  strengthening 
individual trade unions, to building a stronger 
movement and raising the Australian 
standard of living. For a period in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, communists such as 
Alec M acdonald, Tom W right, Jim  Healy 
and  G erry  D aw so n  m ade s ig n ifican t 
contributions to  the work of the ACTU
executive. But in the last th irty  years the 
revolutionary push has faltered — enough to 
give some credence to Hagan's conclusion 
tha t in the ACTU labourism  has won. How 
far this is a result of unpropitious circum ­
stances or deliberate design is hard to  say. To 
some extent since the 1970s it has probably 
been due to  a weakening of resolve and 
theoretical uncertainty about trade unions as 
such opposed to grassroots industrial ideas 
and organisation.
If revolutionary industrialism  in the ACTU 
ultim ately failed, there may be a case for 
arguing that the original compromise was 
wrong, that revolutionaries would have been 
b e tte r  served if  th ey  had  rem ain ed  
organisationally separate in the industrial 
sphere from labourism just as m any of them 
came to keep themselves political separate. 
They then would have avoided unpalatable 
compromises and would have advanced 
revolutionary objectives, such as industrial 
unionism , w ithout the hesitations and 
preoccupation with every-day struggles that 
have so often characterised m ilitant trade 
union policies. But the answer is, surely, no. 
In this m atter of principle they have largely 
been correct even if on the purely industrial 
level they haven't always been as vigorous in 
prom oting general class issues as they might 
have been.
But perhaps the case against the different 
variants of the basic idea of "Bringing the 
revolution out of big unions" is that they 
failed in the contest with labourism , not in the 
sense of a pragm atic deal, which often 
happened, but in the sense of realising what 
they were up against. The revolutionaries 
followed M arx, Proudhon, K ropotkin, 
Lenin, Trotsky , Stalin and M ao Zedong. But 
they lacked sufficient grasp of a political 
culture firmly rooted in A ustralian realities. 
International communism contributed much 
to working-class consciousness, but it failed 
to address adequately the central issufls of the 
indigenous political culture. Hence, frontal- 
assault ideology predom inated in thinking 
about social change. The intricacies of 
positional political warfare defeated nearly all 
those who attem pted to understand how
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ruling -class strength could be effectively 
challenged.
The politics and dom inant culture of the 
parliam entary state were entrenched and 
could not be overborne by direct attack. The 
existence of the L abor P arty  and the 
possibility of the occasional reality of a Labor 
governm ent provided sufficient opportunity  
for the expression of m ost of the political 
interests of the working class. The general 
level of political class consciousness did not 
pose anything more daring than  a reformed 
parliam entary government.
As em ployers' interests were challenged 
and capitalist governm ents responded, using 
the parliam entary state against the working 
class, the A LP took up the issues that the 
unions expressed through the ACTU. The 
L abor Party  counter-attacked with new 
constitutional policies to reform  and 
dem ocratise the state, thus satisfying the main 
political aspirations of the m ajority of trade 
unionists. If this well-tried form ula for change 
seemed to  come under direct challenge, as in 
1949, not surprisingly m ost trade unionists 
(and necessarily the ACTU) resisted the 
challenge. So the revolutionaries quickly 
found themselves outside the m ainstream  of 
the class, dram atically a t odds with the 
m ajority of the class and unable to  influence 
effectively enough the developm ent of its 
essential character.
Compulsory arbitration
Discussion of com pulsory industrial 
a rb itra tion  and conciliation is a m ajor part of 
The History o f  the ACTU. Rightly, Hagan 
features the special, alm ost unique nature — 
only New Zealand has a basically sim ilar way 
of dealing with industrial disputes — of 
A ustralia 's industrial relations system. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to  be surejust what 
Hagan's view of industrial a rb itra tion  is. His 
account is mainly descriptive, and while it is 
fairly even-handed between labourist views 
and a revolutionary critique there is too  little 
overall analysis. By very largely dividing the 
discussion on principles (the chapters on 
governm ent) from the practice of conciliation
and arib tration  (the chapters on the 
court/com m ission), Hagan sets up an 
additional obstacle to a full appreciation of 
the role of a system of legal enforcem ent in 
A ustralian industrial relations.
D octrinally, revolutionaries attacked any 
reliance on com pulsory arbitration , and 
sometimes advocated withdrawal. Although 
some unions especially in the 1910s and '20s 
fought hard against acknowledging the 
court's power (the seamen in 1918-19 and 
1935-36, engineering workers in 1927, 
waterside workers in 1928 and timber- 
workers in 1929), by the mid-1930s, the 
miners and ironw orkers under communist 
in flu en ce  w ere a c c e p tin g  the c o u r t 's  
im prim atur on whatever portion  of their 
c la im s th ey  co u ld  secure by d irec t 
negotiations and industrial action.
A s J a c k  H u ts o n ,  th e n  an  A E U  
(A m algam ated Engineering Union) research 
officer, wrote in 1966:
The main question therefore is not so much 
whether the arbitration system should be 
abandoned or not, but to what extent it 
should be used. Experience has shown that 
the best results are obtained by making the 
minimum use of it, and as far as possible on 
our terms and not on those of the system.1
P arad o x ica lly , com pulsory  industria l 
a rb itra tion  represented an extension of the 
role of the liberal-dem ocratic state into 
industrial relations — what Justice Higgins, 
the second president of the court, called "a 
new province of law and order". Higgins 
strongly upheld the liberal theory of the rule 
of law and he argued that it could be properly 
applied to industrial relations and the 
resolution of industrial disputes. Despite the 
initial wariness of a substantial proportion  of 
trade unionists, due to  what seemed the 
reasonable practice of Higgins' court, the 
m ajority of trade unionists came to accept this 
view. But a significant minority, especially in 
the period 1919-21, became increasingly 
disillusioned. S tarting in 1921 the Hughes and 
Bruce governm ents steadily eroded what 
independent capacity the court appeared to 
have, and the arb itra tion  system became
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steadily m ore coercive, both in principle and 
practice. As this process unfolded, while not 
changing fundam entally, the m ood of the 
unions and the ACTU became progressively 
more and more adam antly reformist; they 
pressed for radical reconstruction of the 
system.
Since 1930, the ACTU has tried to  get 
Labor governm ents to bring about reforms in 
the direction of a conciliatory, non-coercive 
system, but it has had minimal success. In 
fact, the Chifley government in 1947, by 
raising the court to the status of a court of 
superior record gave it the sort of judicial 
authority  necessary to  punish offenders for 
contem pt of its orders, thus opening the way 
to an increased use of the generality of the 
A c t 's  p e n a l  c la u se s  by  s u b s e q u e n t  
conservative governments. At other times, 
such as in 1930, an anti-L abor majority in the 
Senate has blocked the more conspicuous 
am endm ents that were intended to repeal the 
penal provisions of the Act.
Penal powers and the state
The long cam paign against the so-called 
penal clauses in the 1960s reached its climax 
in 1969 with the jailing of Clarrie O 'Shea for 
contem pt, and a national protest stoppage. 
The G orton and M cM ahon governments had 
to respond by modifying the force of certain 
of the punitive sections of the Act. In 1973, as 
in 1930, Senate obstruction undid Labor's 
am ending bill's reforms. The m ajority of the 
ACTU's submissions proposed total or 
partial abolition of penalties, but in order to 
get the bill through the Senate the Labor 
government redrafted it leaving the penal 
clauses intact. The conservative Senate 
m ajority then insisted on thirty further hostile 
amendments.
W hat follows from  a study of compulsory 
arbitration  in A ustralian industrial relations 
is that while the industrial arb itration  system 
may be an area of class contest, it is the 
coercive aspect of the m odern parliam entary 
state ra ther than  the state as alienated social 
power (settling disputes), that is the stronger 
aspect. The system cram ps the workers'
struggle into a tight framework. Under the 
pressure of the policies of its more m ilitant 
affiliates, the ACTU has moved to  loosen the 
grip of compulsion and heavy penalties for 
breaches of awards and orders but since the 
1920s regardless of the party in governm ent, 
the ultim ate power of the parliam entary state 
has been used to defeat reforms beneficial to 
the workers, The plain conclusion is that 
significant structural reform  of the federal 
arb itra tion  system is highly unlikely w ithout a 
radical reform of the parliam ent itself, 
particularly the role and powers of the Senate.
W hat has been said here really only' 
scratches the surface of a long and complex 
book, with its wealth of new research. (Hagan 
had the help of several able research workers.) 
Two other very im portant topics dealt with 
are, first, the character o f employers' 
o r g a n is a t io n s  a n d  how  c o n s e rv a tiv e  
governm ents and these organisations relate; 
and secondly, the circumstances of the late 
1960s that played a part in Bob Hawke's 
succession to  the ACTU presidency and his 
role as president in shaping ACTU policies. 
They are both of m ajor im portance but 
deserve fuller treatm ent than is possible now.
W hat emerges from  Jim  Hagan's m ajor 
study of the ACTU is that, at the basic 
economic level, the ACTU is increasingly the 
national expression of the existence of a class 
of wage and salary earners. In its economic 
aspects at least, but politically too, to  some 
extent, the ACTU expresses the degree and 
level of class unity, both ideological and 
structural. In a meaningful sense, w ithout the 
ACTU the m odern working class in Australia 
would not exist.
The ACTU is a crucial part of the 
emergence of class and class consciousness in 
A ustralia, and those who are engaged in the 
socialist project in the 1980s ignore the 
ACTU's history and present reality a t their 
peril.
NOTES
1. J. Hutson, Penal Colony to Penal Powers 
(Sydney, 1966), p. 213.
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Discussion:
Red North revisited
In Australian Left Review (No 80), Carmel 
Shute, in her review article of "Red North", said 
that at the beginning of the 1935 crushing season 
the Australian Workers Union (A WU) had won an 
agreement to burn cane in the Ingham district only.
As a participant at the time I know that is not 
correct as the following account will show.
Ingham had two sugar mills, both owned by the 
Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR). About 570 men 
were employed to cut cane for these mills.
For 18 years prior to the 1934 strike, no union 
meeting had been held and most cutters had never 
attended a union meeting. When cutters were 
getting sick in bigger numbers than usual, some 
went to the union office and asked for a meeting to 
be called.
The union refused. The local branch of the 
Communist Party (CPA) initiated a petition and 
collected signatures calling for a union meeting in 
accordance with the AWU constitution.
The required number of signatures was obtained 
and submitted to the union office. The CPA 
advertised the meeting and called on all cutters to 
attend.
Although the AWU organiser went around the 
district telling cutters not to attend, about 80 
percent turned up and voted to go on strike until all 
cane was burnt and Weil's Disease declared an 
industrial disease. This hectic strike was successful.
Prior to the strike, no compensation was paid to 
any sufferer of Weil's Disease; some sufferers could 
not cut cane again; some died. The presence of the 
Commissioner of Police and police reinforcements 
and the hostility of AWU officials could not break 
the strikers' determination to end this grisly 
scandal.
Before the 1935 season started, the CSR, 
assisted by the AWU officials, recruited 200 men 
from the NSW Northern Rivers and arranged for
them to come to Ingham. The plan was to victimise 
the activists of the 1934 strike. The AWU officials 
led the way in saying that it was now safe to cut the 
cane green.
Each cane gang consisted of seven or eight 
cutters and a cook. Together they signed a contract 
to cut cane for a group of three or four employers. 
The AWU now said that all gangs must register 
with the union one week before the sign-on. This 
was done so that the union could hold out any 
militant. If a gang included such a cutter the union 
would tell the gang leader to exclude him or lose 
the contract. Those AWU officials were the most 
effective spies for the CSR and other employers.
Green again
The 1935 season started and cane was cut green. 
Within a few weeks some men became so ill that a 
deputation went to the union office and asked for a 
meeting to be called. The union officials said "no". 
Again, a petition was produced and signatures 
obtained. Ths time the AWU organiser called the 
meeting since it was known that, as in 1934, the 
meeting would take place. But the AWU called the 
meeting for signed-on cutters only and arranged 
for uniformed and plain clothes police to stand at 
the door of the meeting hall. Those who had not 
been signed on for a cut could not attend even 
though they were financial union members.
Nevertheless, the cane was burnt the following 
week.
The 1936 season started at the end of May with a 
record crop. The propaganda machines ran flat 
out. The AWU played a leading part, saying it was 
now safe to cut the cane green and that it would be 
cut green further north. (The strike at Innisfailand 
Tully in the previous year had been defeated.)
Again, the cane was cut green and again, after 
only a few weeks, men were ill. Soon a ward at the 
local hospital was full of cane cutters. Agitation for 
burning was stepped up, groups of cutters again 
made representations to the union. Eventually, the 
cane was burnt, but not before some cutters were 
badly affected. One young Italian became so ill and 
close to death that he received the last sacraments. 
After four or five weeks he recovered and applied 
for compensation. He sought help from the AWU 
but, as usual, they said the they could not do 
anything.
The case went to court. The insurance company 
brought Dr Raphael Cilento to help them against 
this disabled cane cutter. Dr Cilento was regarded 
as an authority on tropical diseases but, until this
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case, he had shown no public interest in 
establishing what diseases were affecting cane 
cutters. He had not been in Ingham before.
Now he claimed that the Italian cutter had 
typhus. The cutter lost the case.
A deputation went to the AWU to argue that if 
this cutter had typhus, then the union should do 
something about typhus as an industrial disease. 
Again, the union made a negative response.
Although there was a Labor government in 
office at the time, and there were many such cases, 
any gains that cane cutters made were despite, and 
against opposition from, CSR, the AWU, big
Reviews:
Socialism Sc 
Australian Labor
International Socialism and Australian 
Labour: The Left in Australia 1919-1939 by
Frank Farrell. Hale and Iremonger 1981. 284 
pp. $11.95 Australian. Reviewed by Stuart 
Macintyre.
The interwar period poses particular problems 
for anyone seeking to understand the history of the 
Australian left. At the end of the First World War 
we have the Russian Revolution and the 
establishment of the Communist International. 
Over the next few years the monarchies of Europe 
collapsed, working-class movements reached for 
power and movements of colonial liberation 
sprang up. At the end of the 1920s there was the 
most severe capitalist crisis in history. During the 
1930s the fight against fascism mobilised a broad 
range of progressives.
farmers and rats. Success came only when the rank 
and file became active and able to unite the many 
nationalities making up the workforce on the 
canefields. The driving force for this was the 
Communist Party.
— George Bliss.
* The demand to burn cane developed after it was 
recognised that this was the only way to prevent 
Weil's disease. The virus was spread by rats 
urinating on wet ground or cane stalks.
The left drew on the energies of able men and 
women who made enormous sacrifices, yet the 
record of the left in Australia consists essentially of 
errors, defeats and repeated attempts to rebuild. It 
was not until the Second World War that the 
Australian Communist Party achieved its 
maximum membership — some 20,000 members 
in a population of seven million. By the end of the 
war it held leading posts in unions including the 
miners, the metal trades and the maritime workers, 
representing more than a quarter of the organised 
working class. However, that was the highpoint. 
By the end of the 1940s the Communist Party was 
losing ground. Since then it has suffered defections 
in 1956 and 1968, and two major splits until today 
it is as weak as it was between the wars.
How is it that the left failed? If we look at the 
period from the end of one war to the beginning of 
the next we can recognise certain crucial 
weaknesses. On the eve of the First World War 
there were a number of organisations, the 
pragmatic ones linked to the emergent labor 
movement, the doctrinaire ones more concerned 
with agitation and exerting an efflorescent 
influence on less organised sections of the working 
class. The effect of the Russian Revolution was to 
reorient the left towards Leninist methods, insofar 
as these were understood, but with the re­
establishment of capitalist stability in the 1920s, 
the Communist Party found itself isolated from the 
mainstream of the labor movement, a problem 
compounded by ill-conceived attempts on the part 
of small groups of activists to capture mass 
organisations. The onset of the Depression at once 
created conditions for a left advance and, at the 
same time, saw the communist tactics of the third 
period throw away these advantages with a
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sectarian hostility towards those closest to the left.
Yet to say this is merely to record the historical 
contours of the period. There are further tasks of 
analysis. The institutional and ideological effects 
of patterns established at this time were of lasting 
significance and need to be analysed. There are 
major episodes of resistance to be investigated. The 
emergence of militant forces rebuilding the unions 
in the wastelands of the 1930s or of the generation 
of intellectuals radicalised in that period should be 
traced.
Frank Farrell's decision is to concentrate on the 
influence of the left on the broader labor 
movement and, in particular, to consider its effects 
on Australian labor's attitude to international 
issues. He draws attention to a number of aspects: 
the Hands Off Russia campaign at the end of the 
First World War, support for international 
martyrs like Sacco and Vanzetti, attempts by the 
left to combat Australia's racist immigration rules, 
the anti-fascist campaigns of the 1930s. He also 
draws attention to some organisations of 
importance, especially the Pan-Pacific Trade 
Union movement. The book has material to work 
with of considerable dramatic value and it includes 
more than forty illustrations.
However, there are major problems created by 
Farrell's organisation of the book. His discussion 
of the impact of the left on the organised labor 
movement requires an understanding of the 
history of both. In the first two chapters of the 
book and then, in subsequent passages, Farrell 
provides an account of the development of the left. 
Unfortunately, it is an account which concentrates 
on institutions and doctrines at the expense of the 
larger historical forces. He narrates more than he 
explains. A bewildering number of groups and 
grouplets pass before us (there are more than fifty, 
abbreviations) at a rapid pace. Farrell loses the 
opportunity to put flesh and blood on this 
organisational skeleton by not breathing life into 
the leading characters who were indeed a colorful 
lot. Biographical information is generally 
restricted to captions attached to the illustrations. 
But if the presentation of the left is schematic, the 
treatment of the environment in which it operated 
is even more threadbare. Neither the Australian 
Labor Party nor the trade union movement are 
properly explained.
What is really required in order to understand 
the successes and failures of the left is an account of 
the Australian economy, workforce and social 
patterns. It needs to be explained that the 
Australian economy up to the First World War 
was based on primary industries with much of the
workforce employed on a contractual basis; the 
extractive and service sector, with both craft and 
unskilled labor, was located in the coastal cities. 
Industrialisation began in the twentieth century on 
the basis of tariff protection, state regulation of 
industrial relations and a relatively high standard 
of living for Australian workers. The political and 
industrial practice of the Australian working class 
was thus strongly attached to a populist and 
interventionist tradition which was subject to 
assault from the right in the inter-war period. 
There were possibilities for the left to crystallise 
discontent but it was much more difficult to break 
the institutional mould.
The recurrent theme of Farrell's story, the left's 
alternation between doctrinaire hostility of the 
Labor Party and trade unions and opportunist 
compromise with its more progressive sections, 
have to be understood in this context. By 
fragmenting his study into a serial examination of 
issues and campaigns, Farrell robs his research of 
explanatory power.
This is a book that students of Australian labor 
history will consult for well-researched material on 
the international issues of the inter-war period.
Not all will accept its interpretations. His 
discussion of the White Australia Policy, for 
example, leans over backwards to justify on 
tactical grounds apologists for racism in the labor 
movement. His treatment of the subject of violence 
in the unemployed movements of the 1930s is so 
concerned to preserve an even-handed and 
reasonable tone as to almost lose sight of the 
circumstances of the victims — and in these as well 
as other passages he should have given us some 
particular case studies and used some 
contemporary and oral material. What it does best 
is to survey; it is least successful as an 
interpretation.
I am convinced that the vital task is to turn back 
to the essential basis of the Communist Party, the 
trade unions. We cannot understand the growth of 
the Party in the 1930s unless we grasp how the 
militants worked out a viable strategy of 
leadership. Especially in the maritime, mining and 
metal industries, their achievements were 
enormous. I am not suggesting that we should 
celebrate them uncritically. There were very real 
difficulties — of opportunism and inflexibility, of 
economism and doctrinaire excess — and there 
were specific circumstances that operated in their 
time that do not operate today. But when all 
allowances are made, these elements were crucial 
to Farrell's story and they remain crucial today.
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Australian capitalism: 
in boom and recession
A ustralian Capitalism: in Boom and 
Depression by Robert Catley and Bruce 
McFarlane. Alternative Publishing Co­
operative Limited, Chippendale, 1981. RRp 
$9.95. Reviewed by Kelvin Rowley.
The main themes of Catley and McFarlane's 
latest book are the extent to which Australia's 
economic development has been shaped by the 
pressures of the international capitalist economy 
and by the role of the public sector (and thus, in 
turn, by political decision-making rather than "free 
market" forces). They trace these through three 
historical chapters (one on the 19th century, one on 
the period from 1890 to 1945, and one on the 
Menzies era) and focus on the present in the next 
three (one each on the impact of the "New 
International Economic Order" on Australia, the 
policies of the Whitlam government, and on 
Fraser's government). A closing chapter deals with 
"Options for the 1980s".
Given the direction economic debates have 
taken in Australia over the last decade, this could 
be a valuable book. Under the guise of 
"monetarism" the old doctrines of laissez-faire 
have been resurrected, and it is claimed that the 
economic stagnation of the last few years is the 
result of a public sector which is "too large". The 
dismal failure of market forces to revive the 
economy despite Fraser's vandalism in the public 
sector has shown in practice that these dogmas are 
misconceived, but it is still worthwhile to be 
reminded that they are without historical 
foundation as well.
As Catley and McFarlane emphasise, there 
never was a "golden age" of laissez-faire in 
Australia. On the contrary, throughout the 19th 
century the government played a major role in the 
economy — disposing of the land, importing 
labour (first through convict transportation and 
then assisted immigration) and importing and 
investing capital (borrowing on the London capital 
market to finance railways and other public 
works). The "golden age" of the Liberal Party
under Menzies in the 1950s was not one of laissez- 
faire: directly contrary to Menzies' rhetoric, it was 
one of expanding government intervention and 
regulation in order to achieve rapid economic 
growth and full employment. As the authors 
remark: "The major Australian firms have never 
been committed to rugged free enterprise and the 
application of risk capital; they are committed to 
demanding subsidies, protection, tax concessions 
and an assured market.
Unfortunately, this is not the book that is 
needed. The main themes are submerged in a 
welter of detail as the authors feel obliged to pursue 
side-track they come across. Thus, we are told that 
"the root cause of the latest crisis" is tlje 
"restructuring" of the Australian economy by 
multinational corporations. They attempt to 
demonstrate this in Chapter 5, but it is a disjointed 
series of summaries and polemics from which the 
"conclusions" abruptly emerge, without any real 
justification. They take us through American Cold 
War policies, the OECD's 1977 McCracken report 
on the international economic crisis, the "Pacific 
Rim strategy" for American capital espoused by 
some businessmen in the late 1960s, the growth of 
export-processing zones in the ASEAN countries, 
internal developments in China after the downfall 
of Madame Mao, and the Viet Nam-Kampuchea 
war of 1978-79. Along the way, theories of "long 
waves" of economic growth, the dispute between 
"neo-Ricardians" and "Marxist fundamentalists" 
and the displacement of Keynesian economics by 
so-called "monetarism" are all dealt with.
"Strategy" '
From this mish-mash it is concluded that calls 
from Third World governments for a "New 
International Economic Order" (involving 
increased foreign aid, export price-stabilisation 
and in d u stria lisa tio n  in underdeveloped 
countries)are really a "strategy" of the Rockefeller- 
sponsored Trilateral Commission for the "further 
expansion of capitalism into the peripheral areas" 
of the world economy and are thus a "fraud". It is 
alleged that Australia's part in this "strategy" is the 
"development of new mining and energy industries 
under the control of multinational capital", and 
that (for unspecified reasons) a reduction of tariff 
protection and the "growing de-industrialisation" 
of the Australian economy is the "other side of this 
coin". Needless to say, no evidence of this 
"strategy", let alone of the role assigned to 
Australia in it, is produced. The paranoia too 
typical of leftwing nationalism has taken over from 
rational analysis.
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The authors are better when dealing with 
internal Australian developments. The most useful 
chapters are probably those on the Whitlam and 
Fraser governments. The authors give a blow-by- 
blow account of policy decisions, economic events 
and party in-fighting, much in the manner of the 
financial press. But once again the basic argument 
is submerged by the detail. Essentially, they argue 
that Labor got in by formulating a "rival package 
which could more properly ensure the process of 
the expanded reproduction of capital" — or, to put 
it more simply, they promised business more 
growth and more profits at a time when the 
Liberals were in disarray. But Whitlam and his 
colleagues were manifestly unprepared for the 
inflation and recession that gripped the Australian 
economy in 1973-74; business rallied to the 
Liberals once more. The Whitlam government 
faced a "united phalanx of business opposition", 
and senior public servants and the mass media also 
threw their weight against it. The government was 
already disinegrating rapidly in the face of a hostile 
ruling class when Kerr dismissed it. Catley and 
McFarlane briefly discuss the claim that the 
sacking was the resu lt of C IA /A S IO  
machinations. The evidence in support of this 
allegation is only circumstantial (CIA officers 
referring to Kerr as "our man" in Canberra, etc) 
and they are surely right to conclude that "it is not 
necessary to rely on CIA complicity to account for 
Labor's thrashing".
Fraser got the Liberals back in by promising 
business more growth and more profits — to be 
achieved by reducing inflation, cutting real wages 
and distributing the national income from wages to 
profits, cutting expenditure on welfare, health and 
education, and touting the mineral boom to attract 
foreign investment. But, five years later, he had still 
failed to deliver the goods in terms of higher 
growth rates and there were signs of business 
restiveness.
Catley and McFarlane explain the rise and fall 
of governments in terms of the formulation and 
disintegration of what they call "policy packages", 
supposedly "both appropriate to the needs of 
capital and politically feasible given the level of 
class struggle". They show a considerable passion 
for unearthing conscious design behind the pattern 
of events; even what the authors deride as the ad 
hoc policy-making typical of the Liberals is treated 
as such a package. They do impose some 
intellectual order on the chaos of events they 
describe by means of this device, but I think it is too 
neat and tidy. They identify some intellectual 
influences on governments (OECD technocrats in
the Whitlam government; Friedman's laissez-faire 
"monetarism" in the Fraser government) and then 
attribute the coherence of these intellectual 
constructs to government policies. In their world, 
politicians are always choosing "strategies" and 
"policy packages" rather than making practical 
decisions under pressure of events.
One of the central problems of the book is that 
its theoretical approach is so eclectic. The authors 
invoke numerous economic theorists but make 
little attempt to explain their theories or how they 
fit together, let alone assess their validity. Thus, for 
example, on the central question of what went 
wrong with the Whitlam "package", they first 
summarise a paper by Professor Fred Gruen, one 
of Whitlam's key advisers, who saw it essentially as 
one of misreading the situation and making a 
succession of policy blunders as a result and, 
second, the AMWSU's Australia Uprooted 
pamphlet, which argued that the government's 
policies were deliberately wrecked by an 
"investment strike" by multinational corporations. 
Presumably they themselves would agree more 
with the latter view but they give no grounds for 
preferring one or the other. In general, they 
disapprove of laissez-faire economists, "rightwing" 
Keynesians and "dogmatic" marxists ana approve 
of "leftwing" Keynesian theorists. The Polish 
marxist Michal Kalecki, and his theory of the 
"political business cycle", comes in for particularly 
favorable mention.
This eclecticism means they do not develop a 
coherent explanation and thus gives them little 
basis for reaching any definite conclusions about 
where things are going, except by way of historical 
analogy. In their final chapter on "Options for the 
Eighties", they summarise current views in the 
Labor and Liberal Parties (finding two "packages" 
in the former, three in the latter). They have little to 
say by way of assessment of these, nor do they spell 
out their own solution to Australia's economic 
woes. Their sympathies for the Labor left 
"package" comes through but they conclude that 
there is little chance of it being implemented. They 
end on a pessimistic note: "Even if, as in 1919, 1929, 
1946 and 1972, the public mood were to swing to 
the left in the 1980s it seems unlikely that this 
would benefit the leftwing political parties [such as 
the CPA and its offshoots].... which seems likely to 
decline. Such a mood would be institutionally 
channelled into an ALP electoral victory. And if 
that happens the pattern of accommodations, 
political counter-attacks and defeats outlined 
earlier will likely again come into play. Such is the 
rhythm of the political development of Australian 
capitalism."
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Leninism & 
Western socialism
Leninism and  W estern Socialism by Roy
M edvedev, Verso, 310 pp , $11.75 
(paperback). Reviewed by Dave Davies.
The term "Soviet dissident" was coined in the 
1960s and '70s when a number of independent 
thinkers emerged in the Soviet Union and began 
expressing themselves in various ways.
Since then, their numbers have diminished and 
the range of viewpoints expressed is so wide that a 
term to cover all of them has little value. Mysticism 
and Russian nationalism  have consumed 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn and eclipsed his great 
talent, once at the service of Soviet literature. The 
courage and justified democratic demands of 
Andrei Sakharov have been overshadowed by his 
uncritical acceptance of "Western democracy" and 
support for such reactionary figures as George 
Meany.
But for those remarkable twin brothers Roy and 
Zhores Medvedev the story is different. They have 
kept their political cool in the face of reprisals by 
the authorities such as expulsion from the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, loss of jobs, 
petty and not so petty harassment. Zhores had a 
short spell in a mental institution and —worst of all
— enforced exile from the USSR.
They have retained their objectivity, being able 
to write calmly about the important differences 
between the Stalin, Khrushchov and Brezhnev 
leaderships. Far from remaining static, their ideas 
have evolved and their challenges to dogmatism 
have developed in the framework of a commitment 
to democracy, world peace, socialism and 
marxism.
The subject of this review, Roy, now has an 
impressive list of works to his credit, inluding Let 
History Judge (an appraisal of Stalinism), On 
Socialist Democracy, After the Revolution (an 
analysis of the first months of Soviet power), 
Philip Mironov and the Russian Civil War (the 
Don Cossacks and the revolution), Khrushchov:
The Years in Power and other books and essays. 
Assessing Lenin
An example of the evolution of his ideas is his 
attitude to Lenin. Soviet official history 
untortunately tends to transform the person 
described by Mayakovsky as "this most human of 
all people" into an icon — static, miracle-working, 
infallible and an object of worship. In his early 
writings, Medvedev was evidently influenced by 
this strong element in his political upbringing and 
scarcely questioned what Lenin wrote and did. 
Thus, Stalin erred in departing from Lenin, a 
theme in Let History Judge.
In later works, including the one under review, 
Lenin is an outstanding revolutionary, capable of 
firm resolve, flexibility and penetrating analysis. 
But Lenin did not inherit from Marx and Engels 
any blueprint for the revolution or for the guiding 
of the new socialist state. Inevitably he made 
errors, many of which he explicitly recognised or 
acknowledged by changing course. Lenin's works 
contain many contradictory statements, some of 
them on vital issues.
Medvedev is also critical of Lenin's use of 
invective in polemics — a habit, one might add, 
which has been used as a licence for subsequent 
communist leaders to indulge in language which 
detracted from political and ideological debates.
Medvedev's treatment of Lenin not only restores 
him to his rightful status as an outstanding, living 
hum an being but fac ilita tes a deeper 
understanding of Soviet history. For example, 
Medvedev argues that the New Economic Policy of 
the early 'twenties — usually presented as a 
temporary retreat — should have been introduced 
immediately after the revolution. He believes that 
this was beginning to occur to Lenin himself when 
he saw the dramatic way in which the Soviet 
economy and the political situation improved with 
NEP.
The strongest sections of this book are the first 
five chapters in which Medvedev discusses such 
vexed auestions as m arxism , leninism  
and marxism-leninism, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, Soviets as a form of revolutionary 
power, majority and minority in revolution, and 
socialism in one country.
The reader may not agree with all his 
formulations and conclusions, but will be struck by 
his detailed knowledge, his clarity and his deflation 
of official dogma, all of which draw upon the best 
traditions of the Russian and Soviet revolutionary
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tradition. Above all, the author is concerned with 
the definite historical conditions that gave rise to 
concepts such as "dictatorship of the proletariat", 
rather than treating them as abstract principles or 
eternal truths.
Medvedev's exposition of the above historical 
issues will be refreshing to more than one 
generation of Australian leftists. This includes 
those who grew up with an uncritical acceptance of 
the rather sterile official accounts of Soviet history 
and also those who grew up during the Cold War 
and subsequent periods when the great 
contribution of the Soviet people to the socialist 
cause was obscured both by Western propaganda 
and actions of the Soviet leadership.
Less satisfying, perhaps, is the final chapter on 
"Communists and Social Democrats in the West". 
Not that one could argue much with his criticisms 
of Social-Democratic parties or the ingrained 
sectarianism of many communist parties in the 
West.
Communists and Social Democrats
But Roy Medvedev has never travelled outside 
the USSR and lacks first-hand experience of 
advanced capitalist countries. And in the USSR, 
reliable information on the outside world as well as 
open debate are often lacking. For example, 
following the imposition of martial law in Poland, 
polemics ensued on a range of issues between the 
CPSU and the Italian Communist Party. The 
actual views of the PCI were not published in the 
USSR, and unless access could be gained to PCI 
documents, the Soviet citizen had only distorted 
accounts and quotes torn out of context to go on.
Thus, the reader may find that Medvedev is not 
so authentic in this last chapter, resorting to even- 
handed criticism of both Communists and Social 
Democrats and lacking, to some extent, an 
appreciation of elements of a viable socialist 
strategy for advanced capitalist societies.
His knowledge of "eurocommunism", of PCI 
debate on a "third way", or of the emphasis on 
democracy for many Western communist parties 
appears incomplete. But, having said that, it must 
be added that Medvedev's critique is vastly 
superior to the naive views of some other Soviet 
"dissidents" and the official blinkered view.
There is another heartening aspect of this book. 
One gets the impression from the number of 
sources quoted that Medvedev is able to draw on 
the resources of a number of other people involved 
in the field of history and contemporary politics. If
this impression is correct, it indicates that there are 
a number of people dissatisfied with current 
official thinking despite the decline in the number 
speaking out.
The existence of frustrated Soviet historians 
would not be surprising in view of the restrictions 
placed on research and discussion. For instance, 
the very name of Khrushchov, who was the most 
prominent Soviet leader from soon after Stalin's 
death in 1953 right up to 1964, cannot be 
mentioned. Some years ago, an officially 
commissioned history of the collectivisation of 
agriculture was prepared by a group of scholars — 
only to be scrapped at the last moment (it was 
already set in type according to some) by an edict 
from above.
Unfortunately, the tendency has been for 
historians and others to comply with official 
req uirements for the sake of their careers. But if my 
hunch is correct, and some are now pressing to 
have their views expressed in one way or another, it 
is a positive sign.
The words used most often these days to 
describe various aspects of Soviet life include 
"immobility", "stagnation" and even "regression". 
The writings of people such as Roy Medvedev 
induce the optimist to reflect that the October 
Revolution and the great struggles and 
achievements of the Soviet people are too vital to 
be always encrusted by dogma and bureaucracy.
Under the Hook
Under the Hook: Melbourne Waterside 
Workers Remember Working Lives and 
Class War, 1900-1980 by Wendy Lowenstein 
and Tom Hills, Melbourne Bookworkers 
Publishers, in association with the 
Australian Society for the Study o f Labour 
History, Prahran, Victoria, 1982. Reviewed 
by Drew Cottle.
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In those "silent" days before oral history had 
achieved even its present bastard status in 
Australian intellectual circles, Brian Fitzpatrick 
penned an article for Meanjin entitled "The origins 
of the people are not in the library".1 Fitzpatrick 
could easily have exchanged the word "history" for 
"origins".
Drew Cottle teaches in the General Studies 
Department, University o f New South Wales.
•  Waterside worker — Noel Counihan
Fitzpatrick, a victim of the Cold War, wrote his 
populist piece as a broadside against the 
conservative counter-revolution which was 
c u rre n tly  tak in g  p lace in A u s tra lia n  
historiography. Few listened to Fitzpatrick as, by 
administrative fiat, his voice was effectively 
excluded from the common room discourses of 
academe on the subject. Some time later, Wendy 
Lowenstein (along with a small, talented and 
industrious band which included Bill Wannan,
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John Meredith, John Manifold and others), was 
collecting Australian folksongs and folklore: the
•M echanised waterfront today
threads of the people's history. In many ways, the 
work that Lowenstein and company performed 
was as an active cultural resistance front to the 
rapid Americanisation of Australian material life. 
That battle, of course, is far from over. And Under 
the Hook is another bullet in this continuing 
cultural war of position.
This peregrination into the past is not meant to 
create the genesis of a Lowenstein legend, it is to 
place her work in a political and cultural context 
which not only makes the production of Under the 
Hook intelligible. But also to underline the 
stubborn fact that her practice of radical history 
did not fall from the skies or, more pointedly, was 
not imported via Sussex University or a Chicago 
radio station.2 Wendy Lowenstein was listening 
and talking to working people about their lives well 
before the current antipodean oral history cult 
burst upon the scene. One need only examine the 
back issues of Australian Tradition or the work, 
Cinderella Dressed in Yella3 which she co-edited 
with June Factor and the late Ian Turner, to 
appreciate the point that Lowenstein has paid her 
dues. Indeed, it was this learning by doing, this 
recording of the struggles, the aspirations, 
inspirations and tragedies of those largely written 
out of Australian history's Who's Who which led 
Lowenstein to begin her first major oral history 
project, Weevils in the Flour.4
This massive tome was Lowenstein's tribute to 
the working-class lives irrevocably scarred by the 
Great 1930s Depression. Weevils filled an 
enormous gap in Australian historiography. By 
Lowenstein's sure and skilful hand, popular 
memory of the Depression was rescued from 
oblivion. Weevils established oral history in its 
own right — notwithstanding the angels-on-a- 
pinhead criticisms hurled at Weevils and the 
practice of oral history generally by some 
academics.
The first sample of authentic people's hisotry 
had finally arrived in the libraries. Oral history 
associations flourished. Oral history projects, 
some pedestrian and some bold in their 
conception, blossomed.5 More importantly, the 
critical success of Weevils sent Lowenstein off on 
another path-breaking effort — this time into the 
torpid wasteland of Australian local history. It 
was, however, to be a local history with a 
difference.
Unlike the plethora of inane "classless" local 
histories, "wage slavery" was to be the pivotal 
centre of Lowenstein's new study: the remembered 
struggles and experiences of Melbourne's wharfies.
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Only Lowenstein's links with, and a high standing 
born of activism in, Melbourne's organised labor 
movement enabled her to even contemplate a 
remembered history of these workers.;. Her firm 
friend and co-author of Under the Hook, Tom 
Hills, made it a practical possibility. The 
enthusiastic co-operation of rank-and-file wharfies 
and the collective efforts of those whom 
Lowenstein and Hills acknowledged in their 
rousing class stand6 ensured that the production of 
Under the Hook would be a completed reality.
Tom Hills' fighting proletarian spirit was a 
constant inspiration to the purpose, direction, tone 
and structure of Under the Hook. Lowenstein 
could have been shunned as a pestering 
interviewer, or worse, treated as a potential bosses' 
pimp if it had not been for Hills' willingness to urge 
workers to openly discuss their working lives. 
Because Hills had proven his worth in past "blues" 
on the waterfront, the making of Under the Hook 
was given every assistance. Had Lowenstein, 
armed with a tape-recorder, first appeared out of 
"management's" headquarters, the Melbourne 
wharfies would have been as mute and as unco­
operative as the cargoes they shifted. Critics of 
Lowenstein's "one-class history" view, such as 
Peter Spearritt, have failed to realise that in the 
continuous class struggle between labor and 
capital one cannot levitate above the barricades or 
be on both sides simultaneously.7 Oral history, like 
all history, is not a "supraclass" phenomenon.
Bob Gollan is only partly correct when he 
suggests that, " This ( Under the Hook) is not the 
history of Melbourne's waterside workers .... "8 
Judging by the past efforts of labor history and its 
preference for the safe, institutional ground of 
trade union hierarchies, Labor parties and 
governments, Under the Hook is the Melbourne 
wharfies' story over 80 years. It is a local and oral 
history of "the Port" written in a new and exciting 
way, as Lowenstein and Hills assert, "from a 
militant working class point of view". It is history 
from the bottom up. It is a repository of lived 
history, remembered history, rather than the cold 
and deadly abstractions of most history texts. 
Working people live and breathe in Under the 
Hook. Their personal and collective triumphs and 
tragedies are paramount.
Not being handicapped with a tin ear as some 
oral historians tend to grow when they pretend "to 
listen to the masses", Lowenstein, by dint of hard 
yakka as a folklorist and a deep understanding of 
the material and emotional realities of working - 
class life, has captured in the pages of Under the
Hook, the rich cadences, irrepressible humour and 
the indomitable collective strength of working- 
class language and culture.9 The bankrupt verbal 
slur of the "Ocker" millionaire John Singleton is 
foreign to its pages. Nor are the wharfies' oral 
traditions "Orwellised", thankfully, into "plain and 
simple English".10 The chapters of Under the Hook 
complement each other superbly. The voices of 
Tom Hills, Lou Albress, Don Strang, Jim Nagel, 
Bert King, John Morrison, the McLeavy family, 
Manny Calleja, etc weave a fine mosaic of 
remembered struggle and experience.
But they are not the tall waterfront tales of a 
golden nostalgic past. For no such past exists for 
those whose sweat and labor secured the profit 
margins of the shipowners and their kind. They are 
the stories of workers whose many battles — be it 
against shipping companies' lockouts, "kept" 
courts, the bull system, the police, scabs, 
containerisation, alcoholism, or their fight fo r  
better wages and conditions and a resolute 
proletarian internationalism — have hitherto gone 
largely unrecorded (at least in their own words). In 
these stories we learn what "sticking up for and 
covering your mates on the job" means. Fraternity 
or mateship and that much abused notion "a fair 
go" is shown to be an existential part of every 
Melbourne wharf-labourer. Only those whose own 
decorous lives are bereft of such qualities can 
afford to lampoon them.
This is not to suggest that wharfies are marble 
angels, for quite clearly they are not. Crime and 
criminals as Under the Hook details do exist on the 
wharves. However, here the very notion of crime 
and the working class must be called into question 
when a social system which perpetuates the crime 
that the labor of the vast majority should bolster 
the lives of that acute minority, the very rich. The 
wharfies live out Ned Kelly's defiant aphorism, 
" .... Your bloody rich man's government will never 
govern me!"
The effects of the booms, busts and wars in the 
era of late imperialism on the lives of Melbourne 
wharfies are faithfully recorded in Under the 
Hook. Here the political truth, "the personal is the 
political", is made plain. The constant struggle to 
find work, to feed, clothe and shelter one's family, 
to love and be loved, to laugh, to stand up to the 
boss, to seek relief and release in the 
companionship of the jar occur on every page. A 
thorough reading of Under the Hook has given this 
reviewer a deeper appreciation of the hidden 
dimensions of what the phrase "down the 
struggling years" actually means to working 
people.
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The deft use of personal and official 
photographs as well as Noel Counihan's sketches 
throughout the book consolidate its visual and 
narrative power. Whether it be coalies on their last 
shift smoko (p. 19), Gang 255 slinging sheepskins at 
Prince's Pier (p. 140), the trucking of bales of wool 
in gunny sacks (p. 164) or Counihan's line drawings 
of wharfies shouldering the load (p. 122), all 
poignantly complement the collective narative of 
the wharfies.
Constructive rather than carping criticism can, 
of course, be levelled at Under the Hook. The 
number of workers interviewed for the study is too 
limited. The ethnic composition of the wharfies, 
particularly after World War II, is relatively 
neglected. The changing material circumstances of 
wharfies and their families is not rigorously 
analysed. The contemporary reputation of the 
Melbourne WWF branch as being, "rebel group" 
and the pervasive influence of "Maoism" on the 
Melbourne piers despite the recent retirement of 
Ted Bull is not explained. The failure to scrutinise 
the archives of the shipping companies and the 
state during the turbulent times of prolonged 
strikes and rap id  techno log ica l change 
(containerisation) to assess the strategies of the 
ruling class and its governmental minions is 
somewhat surprising. So, too, is the dearth of 
statistical information on shipping company 
profits and the innumerable work-related illnesses, 
ailments and health hazards of the stevedoring 
industry. It is a simple task to point out these 
blindspots in Under the Hook. However, even to 
suggest these neglected areas of research conjures 
up the need for a veritable army of 
interdisciplinary research workers — something 
the capitalist state itself has neither done nor will 
ever do for any industry let alone Melbourne's 
waterfront.
Like Weevils in the Flour, Under the Hook 
stands as another monument to Lowenstein's 
creative efforts to rescue Australia's proletarian 
past. In these desperate times of staggering foreign 
domination, vanishing work and vanishing 
workers, Under the Hook and more popular 
history in a similar vein is needed if the Australian 
working class is to win back its country and its 
history. On re-reading Under the Hook, I am 
reminded of the sentiments the great German artist 
Kathe Kollwitz expressed in her diary:
.... For me the Koenigsberg longshoremen 
had beauty; the Polish jimkes on their grain 
ships had beauty; the broad freedom of 
movement in the gestures of the common 
people had beauty. Middle class people held
no appeal to me at all. Bourgeois life as a 
whole seemed to be pedantic. The 
proletariat, on the other hand, had a 
grandness of manner, a breadth to their lives 
n
The remarkable achievement of Under the Hook 
is that it captures this proletarian beauty with 
infinite sensitivity.
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